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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 As a female college student is exiting her car, a masked adult 
male runs toward her, points a gun, and instructs her to hand over 
her money and property.1 He then orders her to get into the passen-
ger seat of her own car, which he drives off in pursuit of another ve-
hicle.2 After the two cars come to a stop, an armed sixteen-year-old 
male enters the victim’s vehicle; both males are pointing their guns 
at the female victim.3 The sixteen-year-old orders the victim out of 
the car and continues to hold her at gunpoint while he and his ac-
complice take turns raping her.4 They then force her to the trunk and 
rape her again.5 The brutality continues as the sixteen-year-old 
throws the victim onto the ground and, while still holding her at 
gunpoint, the two males take turns repeatedly raping her.6 The six-
teen-year-old is convicted as an adult of numerous offenses and is 
sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling eighty-nine 
years.7 He challenges the constitutionality of his sentence pursuant 
to Graham v. Florida.8  
 In Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court held that the imposition 
of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile nonhomicide offender 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.9 The holding was motivated by the Court’s recognition 
that juveniles are constitutionally different from adults because the 
characteristics of youth render them less morally culpable.10 Thus, 
juveniles are less deserving of the second-harshest punishment of life 
without parole, which impermissibly leaves them without hope of re-
lease upon demonstrated reform.11 Accordingly, states are required to 
provide juvenile nonhomicide offenders with “some meaningful op-
portunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and re-
habilitation.”12 While states must provide juveniles with “some realis-
tic opportunity to obtain release,” they “need not guarantee [juvenile] 
offender[s’] eventual release” from prison.13 
 The Graham opinion has led to an abundance of uncertainty and 
litigation; indeed, courts and legislatures are struggling to resolve 
several significant issues. This Note examines whether it is unconsti-
                                                                                                                     
 1. Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 547-48 (6th Cir. 2012).  
 2. Id. at 548. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id.  
 7. Id. at 547. 
 8. Id.  
 9. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2017-18, 2034 (2010). 
 10. See id. at 2026-27. 
 11. See id. 
 12. Id. at 2030. 
 13. Id. at 2034. 
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tutional pursuant to Graham to impose a lengthy term-of-years-
without-parole sentence on a juvenile nonhomicide offender, such as 
the eighty-nine-year sentence on the juvenile rapist described above. 
To properly resolve Graham’s applicability to term-of-years sentences 
and the attendant line-drawing problems, it is necessary to ad-   
dress what constitutes the requisite “meaningful opportunity” to             
obtain release.   
 Accordingly, Part II provides a general overview of the Eighth 
Amendment, a thorough review of the Supreme Court’s precedent 
establishing that juveniles are constitutionally different from adults, 
and an introduction to the issues discussed in this Note. Part III pro-
vides a comprehensive description of how courts across the nation 
have resolved Graham’s applicability to term-of-years sentences and 
offers a critique of the present approaches. Part IV examines what 
the Court’s mandate to provide “some meaningful opportunity to ob-
tain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation”14 
entails and presents the proper approach to Graham’s applicability to 
term-of-years sentences. Part IV also describes Florida’s unsuccessful 
legislative efforts to comply with Graham’s mandate and provides 
guidance for future efforts. Part V offers concluding remarks.    
II.   THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT ESPECIALLY PROTECTS JUVENILES  
  Section A provides a general overview of the punishments the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits, the purposes of the Amendment, and 
the Supreme Court’s approaches to Eighth Amendment challenges. 
Section B provides a thorough analysis of Roper v. Simmons and 
Graham v. Florida—the Court’s cases establishing that juvenile of-
fenders are constitutionally different from adults and must receive 
special Eighth Amendment protection. Lastly, Section C introduces 
the significant issues that arise from Graham and lie at the heart of 
this Note.   
 A.  The Eighth Amendment: Prohibitions, Purposes, and Analyses 
 The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
nounces that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”15 The 
Eighth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment16 and prohibits “ ‘all excessive punishments, as 
                                                                                                                     
 14. Id. at 2030. 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
 16. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008). Kennedy held that the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments proscribe the imposition of the death penalty for child rape. Id. at 
421. The Court concluded that “there is a distinction between intentional first-degree 
murder on the one hand and nonhomicide crimes against individual persons, even 
including child rape, on the other” because nonhomicide crimes “cannot be compared to 
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well as cruel and unusual punishments that may or may not            
be excessive.’ ”17  
 The Eighth Amendment proscriptions are premised on the “basic 
‘precept of justice that punishment for [a] crime should be graduated 
and proportioned to [the] offense.’ ”18 While this proportionality prin-
ciple “is central to the Eighth Amendment,”19 it is “a ‘narrow propor-
tionality principle,’ that ‘does not require strict proportionality be-
tween crime and sentence’ but rather ‘forbids only extreme sentences 
that are grossly disproportionate to the crime.’ ”20 Moreover, the 
Amendment encompasses “the essential principle that . . . the State 
must respect the human attributes even of those who have commit-
ted serious crimes.”21 Accordingly, the prohibitions serve to protect 
“the dignity of man” and ensure that the government exercises its 
power to punish “within the limits of civilized standards.”22  
 To determine what sentences comply with the civilized standards 
and are thus not excessive or cruel and unusual, “[t]he Amendment 
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society.”23 Consequently, whether 
the Eighth Amendment prohibits a punishment depends not on the 
standards that prevailed when the Bill of Rights was adopted, but on 
the standards that “currently prevail.”24 The Court’s precedent con-
cerning sentence proportionality “fall[s] within two general classifica-
tions”: “challenges to the length of term-of-years sentences” and “cat-
egorical restrictions on the death penalty.”25 In a case involving a 
                                                                                                                     
murder in their ‘severity and irrevocability.’ ” Id. at 438 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 
U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (plurality opinion)). See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240 
(1972) (per curiam); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962). 
 17. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 419 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 n.7 
(2002)). 
 18. Id. (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)). 
 19. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021. 
 20. Id. (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997, 1000-01 (1991) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)); see also Ewing v. California, 538 
U.S. 11, 30-31 (2003) (upholding a prison sentence of twenty-five years to life for felony 
grand theft pursuant to a three-strikes law because the Eighth Amendment’s narrow 
proportionality principle prohibits only “grossly disproportionate” sentences). The Court in 
Ewing also noted that the proportionality principle applies in the noncapital context. Id. at 
23 (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment)). 
 21. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021. 
 22. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). 
 23. Id. at 101; id. at 100-01 (noting “that the words of the Amendment are not precise, 
and that their scope is not static”); see also Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021 (noting the 
standard for determining what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment remains the 
same, but its applicability changes with society’s morals (quoting Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 
419)). 
 24. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002). 
 25. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021. 
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challenge to a term-of-years sentence, “the Court considers all the 
circumstances” of the particular case.26 Specifically,  
[a] court must begin by comparing the gravity of the offense and 
the severity of the sentence. “[I]n the rare case in which [this] 
threshold comparison . . . leads to an inference of gross dispropor-
tionality” the court should then compare the defendant's sentence 
with the sentences received by other offenders in the same juris-
diction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other 
jurisdictions. If this comparative analysis “validate[s] an initial 
judgment that [the] sentence is grossly disproportionate,” the sen-
tence is cruel and unusual.27 
On the other hand, a categorical challenge has historically involved 
the death penalty (at least before Graham v. Florida) and turns on 
either the nature of the offense or the characteristics of the offend-
er.28 In such a case,  
[t]he Court first considers “objective indicia of society’s standards, 
as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice” to de-
termine whether there is a national consensus against the sentenc-
ing practice at issue. Next, guided by “the standards elaborated by 
controlling precedents and by the Court's own understanding and 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's text, history, meaning, 
and purpose,” the Court must determine in the exercise of its own 
independent judgment whether the punishment in question vio-
lates the Constitution.29  
In Graham v. Florida, for the first time the Court faced “a categorical 
challenge to a term-of-years sentence”; because the case “implicate[d] 
a particular type of sentence as it applie[d] to an entire class of of-
                                                                                                                     
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 2022 (citations omitted) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). As the Graham 
Court noted, cases in the terms-of-years category include Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 
(2003) (upholding a prison sentence of twenty-five years to life for the grand theft of golf 
clubs pursuant to a three-strikes law); Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957 (upholding a life without 
parole sentence for possession of a large quantity of cocaine); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 
(1983) (holding unconstitutional a life without parole sentence for a seventh nonviolent 
felony, passing a worthless check); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 371 (1982) (per curiam) 
(upholding a forty-year prison sentence for “possession [of marijuana] with intent to 
distribute and distribution of mari[j]uana”); and Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) 
(upholding a sentence of life with the possibility of parole for a third nonviolent felony 
offense, obtaining money by false pretenses). Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021-22. 
 28. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022. 
 29. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005); 
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 408 (2008)). As the Graham Court noted, cases 
involving a categorical challenge include Kennedy, 554 U.S. 407 (holding unconstitutional 
the death penalty for nonhomicide crimes); Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (holding unconstitutional 
the death penalty for offenders who are under the age of eighteen at the time of the crime); 
Atkins, 536 U.S. 304 (holding unconstitutional the death penalty for mentally retarded 
offenders); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (same); and Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 
584 (1977) (same). Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022.  
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fenders who [had] committed a range of crimes,” the Court applied 
the categorical analysis.30  
 B.  Juveniles Are Constitutionally Different From Adults 
 1.  Roper v. Simmons 
 In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the “imposition of the death 
penalty on offenders who were under the age of [eighteen]” at the 
time of their crime.31 Applying the categorical approach, the Court 
first concluded that the objective indicia of society’s standards 
demonstrate a consensus against the death penalty for juveniles.32 
Specifically, the Court observed that the majority of states do not al-
low the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles, states that do 
allow it rarely impose it, and there has been a trend toward abolish-
ing the practice.33  
 Next, the Court exercised its independent judgment and deter-
mined that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for 
juveniles in light of relevant precedent and the special characteristics 
of youth.34 Precedent has established that because “the death penalty 
is the most severe punishment,”35 it “must be limited to those offend-
ers who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and 
whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execu-
tion.’ ”36 Juveniles are not “among the worst offenders,” as illustrated 
by three chief differences between juveniles and adults.37 The first 
difference, demonstrated by experience and scientific and sociological 
studies, is that “ ‘[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are 
more understandable among the young. These qualities often result 
in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.’ ”38 Second, 
“juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences 
                                                                                                                     
 30. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022-23 (reasoning that comparison of the punishment’s 
severity with the crime’s gravity would be fruitless because the challenge does not involve 
a particular defendant’s sentence, but a whole sentencing practice). 
 31. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.  
 32. See id. at 564, 567. 
 33. Id. at 567. The Court noted that “ ‘[i]t is not so much the number of these States 
that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change.’ ” Id. at 566 (quoting 
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315). 
 34. Id. at 564, 568-70, 575. 
 35. Id. at 568 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 856 (1988) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment)). 
 36. Id. (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319). 
 37. Id. at 569. 
 38. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). 
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and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”39 Third, “the charac-
ter of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The person-
ality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.”40 As such, “it 
is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed 
by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character . . . , for 
a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will 
be reformed.”41 These manifest differences reveal that juveniles pos-
sess diminished culpability for their crimes.42  
 Consequently, juvenile death sentences do not fully serve retribu-
tive and deterrence purposes, which are the two penological justifica-
tions for the penalty.43  “Retribution is not proportional if the law’s 
most severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blame-
worthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth 
and immaturity.”44 Moreover, “the absence of evidence of deterrent 
effect is of special concern because the same characteristics that ren-
der juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles 
will be less susceptible to deterrence.”45  
 The Court recognized that drawing the line at the age of eighteen 
is both under- and over-inclusive, but reasoned that “a line must be 
drawn,” and “[t]he age of [eighteen] is the point where society draws 
the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood.”46 Last-
ly, the Court consulted foreign and international law to instruct and 
support, but not control, its interpretation of the Eighth Amend-
ment.47 In doing so, the Court concluded that “the United States now 
[stood] alone in a world that ha[d] turned its face against the juvenile 
death penalty.”48   
 
                                                                                                                     
 39. Id. (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)); see also Eddings, 455 
U.S. at 115 (“[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life 
when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.”). 
 40. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570. 
 41. Id. at 570; see also id. at 573 (noting even psychologists have difficulty 
differentiating between “transient immaturity” and “irreparable corruption”). 
 42. Id. at 561 (noting that “[t]he reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the 
privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is 
not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult” (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 
U.S. 815, 835 (1988))).  
 43. Id. at 571-72 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)). 
 44. Id. at 571. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 574 (concluding that the Court’s logic behind prohibiting the death penalty 
for juveniles under the age of sixteen in Thompson, 487 U.S. 815, extends to juveniles 
under eighteen). 
 47. Id. at 575-78; id. at 578 (“It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our 
pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental 
rights by other nations and peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights 
within our own heritage of freedom.”). 
 48. Id. at 577. 
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 2.  Graham v. Florida 
 Terrance Graham was sentenced to life imprisonment for armed 
burglary and fifteen years imprisonment for attempted armed rob-
bery following a conviction for violation of probation.49 Because Flori-
da had abolished its parole system, Graham had no possibility of re-
lease, save for executive clemency.50 Graham was under the age of 
eighteen at the time of his offenses.51 The issue before the Supreme 
Court was “whether the Constitution permits a juvenile offender to 
be sentenced to life in prison without parole for a nonhomicide 
crime.”52 The Court analyzed the Eighth Amendment issue pursuant 
to the categorical approach53 and answered it in the negative.54 
 The Court first examined the objective indicia of national consen-
sus and found that thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and 
the federal government permit life-without-parole sentences for juve-
nile nonhomicide offenders; however, the actual imposition of the 
sentence is so infrequent that it demonstrates “a consensus against 
its use.”55 Next, the Court scrutinized the constitutionality of the sen-
                                                                                                                     
 49. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2020 (2010). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 2018. Graham was sixteen years old when he committed the armed burglary 
with assault or battery and attempted armed robbery. Id. He pled guilty and begged the 
court for a second chance, promising to turn his life around. Id. The court withheld 
adjudication and sentenced him to three years of probation on each count, to run 
concurrently, with the first twelve months to be served in jail. Id. Less than six months 
after his release from jail, and about a month shy of his eighteenth birthday, Graham was 
arrested for home invasion robbery and attempted robbery following a high-speed chase. 
Id. at 2018-19. The police also found three handguns in his vehicle. Id. at 2019. Graham 
admitted to police that he had been involved in two or three robberies aside from the two 
robberies on the night in question. Id. In court, Graham denied his involvement in the 
home invasion robbery but admitted violating his probation by fleeing from police. Id. The 
court found that Graham violated his probation by attempting to avoid arrest, committing 
home invasion robbery, possessing a firearm, and “associating with persons engaged in 
criminal activity.” Id. Under Florida law, Graham faced a minimum of five years 
imprisonment without a downward departure, and a maximum of life imprisonment. Id. 
The defense attorney requested five years; the Florida Department of Corrections 
recommended at most four years; and the State recommended thirty years for the armed 
burglary and fifteen years for the attempted armed robbery. Id. The trial court judge 
explained that he did not understand how Graham “would be given such a great 
opportunity to do something with [his] life” but would rather “throw it away.” Id. His 
criminal behavior was escalating; because he could not be helped onto the right path, the 
court had to focus on the community’s safety. Id. at 2019-20. 
 52. Id. at 2017-18.  
 53. Id. at 2022-23. The Court was faced with “a categorical challenge to a term-of-
years sentence” for the first time and concluded that only the categorical approach was 
appropriate because “a sentencing practice itself is in question.” Id. at 2022. The challenge 
“implicate[d] a particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class of offenders who 
have committed a range of crimes”; thus, comparing the gravity of the crime to the severity 
of the sentence was unhelpful. Id. at 2022-23. 
 54. See id. at 2034.  
 55. Id. at 2023. Six jurisdictions prohibit life-without-parole sentences for all juvenile 
offenders, and an additional seven jurisdictions prohibit the sentence for juvenile 
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tence pursuant to its own independent judgment.56 The Court began 
by examining the culpability of juvenile nonhomicide offenders and 
concluded that “compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender 
who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpa-
bility. The age of the offender and the nature of the crime each bear 
on the analysis.”57  
 As to age, the Court reaffirmed Roper’s premise that “juveniles 
have lessened culpability” than adults because they “have a ‘lack of 
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility’; they ‘are 
more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside 
pressures, including peer pressure’; and their characters are ‘not as 
well formed.’ ”58 Indeed, psychology and brain science demonstrate 
that the parts of the brain that control behavior continue to develop 
through late adolescence.59 Because juveniles are less morally culpa-
ble and more amenable to change, “they are less deserving of the 
most severe punishments.”60  
 As for the nature of the offense, the Court had “recognized that 
defendants who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be 
taken are categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of 
punishment than are murderers.”61 “[L]ife without parole is ‘the se-
cond most severe’ ”62 sentence and, unlike any other, it has the follow-
ing characteristics in common with the death penalty:  
[T]he sentence alters the offender's life by a forfeiture that is ir-
revocable. It deprives the convict of the most basic liberties with-
out giving hope of restoration, except perhaps by executive clemen-
cy—the remote possibility of which does not mitigate the harsh-
ness of the sentence. . . . [T]his sentence “means denial of hope; it 
means that good behavior and character improvement are imma-
terial; it means that whatever the future might hold in store for 
the mind and spirit of [the convict], he will remain in prison for the 
rest of his days.”63 
Therefore, 
Life without parole is an especially harsh punishment for a juve-
nile. Under this sentence a juvenile offender will on average serve 
                                                                                                                     
nonhomicide offenders. Id. However, only 123 juvenile nonhomicide offenders are serving 
life-without-parole sentences—77 in Florida and 46 across ten states. Id. at 2024. 
 56. Id. at 2026. 
 57. Id. at 2027. 
 58. Id. at 2026 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569). 
 61. Id. at 2027 (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); Tison v. Arizona, 
481 U.S. 137 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 
584 (1977)). 
 62. Id. (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)). 
 63. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 944 (Nev. 1989)). 
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more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an 
adult offender. A 16–year–old and a 75–year–old each sentenced to 
life without parole receive the same punishment in name only. . . . 
This reality cannot be ignored.64 
 The Court next considered legitimate penological goals and con-
cluded that none justify a sentence of life without parole for juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders, thereby rendering the sentence dispropor-
tionate to the offense.65 Retribution does not justify the second-most-
severe sentence for an offender whose moral culpability is twice di-
minished for at “ ‘[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a 
criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability 
of the criminal offender.’ ”66 Moreover, “ ‘the same characteristics that 
render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest . . . that juveniles 
will be less susceptible to deterrence.’ ”67  Regardless, “any limited 
deterrent effect” would not justify the sentence for it is grossly dis-
proportionate “in light of juvenile nonhomicide offenders’ diminished 
moral responsibility.”68 Incapacitation is likewise an insufficient jus-
tification because courts cannot reliably determine at the outset that 
a juvenile is incapable of rehabilitation.69 “A life without parole sen-
tence improperly denies the juvenile offender a chance to demon-
strate growth and maturity.”70 Lastly,  
[t]he penalty forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal. By 
denying the defendant the right to reenter the community, the 
State makes an irrevocable judgment about that person's value 
and place in society. This judgment is not appropriate in light of a 
juvenile nonhomicide offender's capacity for change and limited 
moral culpability. A State's rejection of rehabilitation, moreover, 
goes beyond a mere expressive judgment. . . . [D]efendants serving 
life without parole sentences are often denied access to vocational 
training and other rehabilitative services that are available to oth-
er inmates. For juvenile offenders, who are most in need of and re-
ceptive to rehabilitation, the absence of rehabilitative opportuni-
ties or treatment makes the disproportionality of the sentence all 
the more evident.71   
 Therefore, the Court held, the Eighth Amendment bars life-
without-parole sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders.72 The 
Court clarified the scope of this prohibition: 
                                                                                                                     
 64. Id. at 2028 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005)). 
 65. Id. at 2028-30.  
 66. Id. at 2028 (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)). 
 67. Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 571). 
 68. Id. at 2029. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 2030 (citations omitted). 
 72. Id.  
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A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile 
offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime. What the State must 
do, however, is give defendants like Graham some meaningful op-
portunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and 
rehabilitation. It is for the State, in the first instance, to explore 
the means and mechanisms for compliance. . . . The Eighth 
Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that persons convict-
ed of nonhomicide crimes committed before adulthood will remain 
behind bars for life. It does forbid States from making the judg-
ment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to     
reenter society.73  
Thus, if the State imposes a life sentence on a juvenile nonhomicide 
offender, it must provide the juvenile “with some realistic opportuni-
ty to obtain release before the end of that term.”74 Lastly, the Court’s 
holding was supported, although not controlled, by the global consen-
sus that exists against the imposition of life without parole sentences 
on juvenile nonhomicide offenders; indeed, the United States was the 
only nation that actually imposed the sentence.75   
C.  Complying With Graham v. Florida: Unresolved Issues  
 The Graham opinion raises a multitude of issues, including the 
following two interrelated matters that remain unresolved.76 The first 
                                                                                                                     
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 2034. 
 75. Id. at 2033-34 (noting that eleven nations authorize life-without-parole sentences 
for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, but only the United States imposes it).  
 76. Additionally, the Graham holding was limited to juvenile nonhomicide offenders, 
leaving open the question of whether the Eighth Amendment bars life-without-parole 
sentences for juvenile homicide offenders. In Miller v. Alabama, the Court avoided this 
issue by concluding that it was the sentencing schemes mandating life without parole that 
made the juvenile homicide offenders’ life without parole sentences unconstitutional. 132 S. 
Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012). Indeed, the Court expressly retained the possibility of life-without-
parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders. Id. Notably though, the Court opined that 
the sentence would rarely be appropriate. Id. This comment, coupled with the Roper, 
Graham, and Miller holdings, may very well signal the Court’s willingness to extend 
Graham to juvenile homicide offenders—a conclusion that did not go undrawn by the 
Miller dissenters. See id. at 2489-90 (Alito, J., dissenting). Moreover, even though Graham 
emphasized the twice-diminished culpability of juvenile nonhomicide offenders, the Court 
must deem unconstitutional life without parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders in 
order to remain true to the principle that juveniles are constitutionally different from 
adults. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026-27. This point is illustrated by the Graham 
dissenters:  
[I]n the end, the Court does not even believe its pronouncements about the 
juvenile mind. If it did, the categorical rule it announces today would be most 
peculiar because it leaves intact state and federal laws that permit life-without-
parole sentences for juveniles who commit homicides. The Court thus 
acknowledges that there is nothing inherent in the psyche of a person less than 
[eighteen] that prevents him from acquiring the moral agency necessary to 
warrant a life-without-parole sentence. . . . The Court is quite willing to accept 
that a [seventeen]-year-old who pulls the trigger on a firearm can demonstrate 
sufficient depravity and irredeemability to be denied reentry into society, but 
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issue is whether Graham applies to a lengthy term-of-years-without-
parole sentence that is imposed on a juvenile nonhomicide offender. 
In his Graham dissent, Justice Alito emphasized that the majority’s 
holding was limited to “ ‘the sentence of life without parole’ ” and in 
no way affected term-of-years sentences.77 While several courts have 
followed this reasoning, Part III, Section B demonstrates why the 
reasoning is flawed and leads to an unconstitutional result. The se-
cond issue Graham leaves unresolved concerns the manner in which 
states can achieve compliance with its holding. As the dissent cor-
rectly noted, the Court’s holding “invite[s] a host of line-drawing 
problems . . . . But what, exactly, does such a ‘meaningful’ opportuni-
ty entail? When must it occur? And what Eighth Amendment princi-
ples will govern review by parole boards the Court now demands that 
States empanel?”78 This matter is addressed and expanded upon in 
Parts III and IV.  
III.   GRAHAM’S APPLICABILITY TO TERM-OF-YEARS-WITHOUT-PAROLE 
JUVENILE SENTENCES  
 Courts across the nation are at a loss regarding Graham’s ap-
plicability to lengthy term-of-years-without-parole sentences for ju-
venile nonhomicide offenders. Section A provides an exhaustive re-
view of the case law and the two approaches courts have taken. Sec-
tion B offers a critical analysis of each approach and ultimately     
rejects both. 
A.  Current Approaches to Graham’s Applicability to                    
Term-of-Years Sentences  
 1.  Graham Does Not Apply to Term-of-Years Sentences 
  (a)  Arizona Court of Appeals  
 The Court of Appeals of Arizona rejects Graham’s applicability to 
a term-of-years sentence.79 In State v. Kasic, the court considered an 
aggregate juvenile sentence of 139.75 years, imposed for thirty-two 
felony convictions that stemmed from six arsons and one attempted 
                                                                                                                     
insists that a [seventeen]-year-old who rapes an [eight]-year-old and leaves her 
for dead does not. 
Id. at 2055 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In the meantime, courts continue to 
uphold life without parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. 
State, 50 So. 3d 633, 635-36 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 869 (Ind. 
2012); State v. Ninham, 2011 WI 33, ¶¶ 97-98, 333 Wis. 2d 335, 797 N.W.2d 451, 478. 
Further discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 77. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2058 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2030 (majority 
opinion)). 
 78. Id. at 2057 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 79. State v. Kasic, 265 P.3d 410, 414-15 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011). 
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arson Kasic committed during a one-year period beginning at the age 
of seventeen.80 The court affirmed Kasic’s sentence and held Graham 
inapplicable on the ground that the Graham holding was expressly 
limited to sentences of “life without parole solely for a nonhomicide 
offense”81 and did not require a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s even-
tual release from prison.82  
 (b)  Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal 
The Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida has also pro-
nounced that Graham does not apply to lengthy term-of-years sen-
tences.83 In Guzman v. State, the defendant was sentenced to sixty 
years of imprisonment for violating his probation, which had been 
imposed for offenses he committed as a juvenile.84 Guzman argued on 
appeal that his sixty-year sentence constituted a de facto life sen-
tence in violation of Graham.85 The court rejected this argument be-
cause it “believe[d] that the express holding of Graham established a 
bright-line and all-encompassing prohibition on actual life sentences 
without the possibility of parole” and “did not address the concept of 
a de facto life sentence.”86 The court further stated: 
[I]t is logistically impossible to determine what might or might not 
constitute a de facto life sentence—assuming such a concept is to 
be considered in the first instance. We should not burden our trial 
courts by directing them to function as actuaries in determining 
each individual defendant’s particularized life expectancy.87  
Accordingly, the court affirmed Guzman’s sixty-year sentence.88 It 
also certified conflict with the decisions of the First District Court of 
Appeal of Florida, and it certified the following questions to the Flor-
ida Supreme Court as being of great public importance: “1. Does 
Graham v. Florida . . . apply to lengthy term-of-years sentences that 
                                                                                                                     
 80. Id. at 411. 
 81. Id. at 414 (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023).  
 82. Id. at 415 (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030). Upon concluding that “Graham 
does not categorically bar” lengthy term-of-years sentences, id., the court applied the 
proportionality approach and upheld Kasic’s sentence, id. at 415-16. 
 83. Guzman v. State, No. 4D12-1354, 2013 WL 949889, at *1, *3 (Fla. 4th DCA Mar. 
13, 2013).  
 84. Id. at *1. At the age of fourteen, Guzman committed several violent offenses to 
which he pleaded guilty; his sentence included “juvenile probation to be followed by adult 
probation.” Id. After reaching the age of majority, Guzman was convicted of kidnapping 
and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. The court also imposed a concurrent life sen-
tence for violation of probation, which was subsequently reversed and replaced by a sixty-
year prison term. Id.   
85.  Id. 
86.  Id.  
87.  Id. at *3.  
88.  Id. 
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amount to de facto life sentences?” and “2. If so, at what point does a 
term-of-years sentence become a de facto life sentence?”89 
 (c)  Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal 
 The Fifth District Court of Appeal of Florida likewise rejects Gra-
ham’s applicability to a lengthy term-of-years sentence.90 In Henry v. 
State, seventeen-year-old Henry broke into a stranger’s apartment, 
battered the victim, threatened her with a gun, and sexually assault-
ed her repeatedly.91 He then made her take a shower and forced her 
to drive him to an ATM and withdraw money.92 Henry was sentenced 
to concurrent and consecutive sentences totaling ninety years impris-
onment.93 On appeal, Henry argued that because his life expectancy 
was 64.3 years,94 the ninety-year sentence constituted a de facto life 
without parole sentence, in violation of Graham.95 The court rejected 
Henry’s argument and quoted Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion that 
the Graham holding does not affect a lengthy term-of-years sen-
tence.96 The court also distinguished the “lengthy aggregate term-of-
years sentence without the possibility of parole” from a “life sentence 
without parole.”97 Moreover, it noted that not a single Florida court 
had invalidated a lengthy term-of-years sentence pursuant to Gra-
ham, and other jurisdictions were split on the issue.98 Lastly, the 
court reasoned that a holding that refuses to extend Graham to a 
                                                                                                                     
89.  Id.  
 90. Henry v. State, 82 So. 3d 1084, 1089 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). The Florida Supreme 
Court has accepted jurisdiction of the case. Henry v. State, 107 So. 3d 405 (Fla. 2012).  See 
also Johnson v. State, 108 So. 3d 1153, 1154 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (mem.) (per curiam) (af-
firming the juvenile offender’s 100-year sentence for armed burglary of a dwelling, and 
certifying conflict with Floyd v. State, 87 So. 3d 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), and Adams v. 
State, No. 1D11-3225, 2012 WL 3193932, at *1 (Fla. 1st DCA Aug. 8, 2012)); Mediate v. 
State, 108 So. 3d 703, 704, 706 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (“reject[ing] the defendant’s invitation 
to revisit Henry,” and affirming his 130-year sentence for kidnapping and four counts of 
sexual battery). 
 91. Henry, 82 So. 3d at 1085. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1086. Henry was convicted of “three counts of sexual battery with a deadly 
weapon or physical force, one count of kidnapping with intent to commit a felony (with a 
firearm), two counts of robbery, one count of carjacking, one count of burglary of a dwelling, 
and one count of possession of twenty grams or less of cannabis.” Id. at 1085. His original 
sentence included several life sentences, which was modified pursuant to Graham. Id. at 
1085-86. 
 94. Id. at 1086. Henry filed a National Vital Statistics Report that demonstrated his 
life expectancy at birth was 64.3 years based on his sex and race. Id.  
 95. Id. Under Florida law, an inmate must serve eighty-five percent of his sentence 
before becoming eligible for release pursuant to gaintime; thus, Henry had to serve at least 
76.5 years in prison. Id. 
 96. See id. at 1087. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 1087-89. The court explained that intermediate appellate courts in 
California were split on the issue, whereas courts in Georgia and Arizona had consistently 
rejected Graham’s applicability to term-of-years sentences. Id. at 1088-89. 
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term-of-years sentence will be easy to follow.99 On the other hand, 
Graham provides no direction for a holding to the contrary:  
At what number of years would the Eighth Amendment become 
implicated in the sentencing of a juvenile: twenty, thirty, forty, fif-
ty, some lesser or greater number? Would gain time be taken into 
account? Could the number vary from offender to offender based 
on race, gender, socioeconomic class or other criteria? Does the 
number of crimes matter? There is language in the Graham major-
ity opinion that suggests that no matter the number of offenses or 
victims or type of crime, a juvenile may not receive a sentence that 
will cause him to spend his entire life incarcerated without a 
chance for rehabilitation, in which case it would make no logical 
difference whether the sentence is “life” or 107 years. Without any 
tools to work with, however, we can only apply Graham as it is 
written. If the Supreme Court has more in mind, it will have to say 
what that is.100  
 (d)  Florida Second District Court of Appeal 
 Similarly, the Second District Court of Appeal of Florida held 
Graham inapplicable to a term-of-years sentence in Walle v. State.101 
In Pinellas County, Walle was sentenced to a total of twenty-seven 
years imprisonment for armed sexual battery, two counts of kidnap-
ping, and three counts of armed robbery.102 Subsequently, in Hills-
borough County he was sentenced to a total of sixty-five years im-
prisonment upon convictions on eighteen counts, including armed 
kidnappings and armed sexual batteries.103 The sixty-five-year sen-
tence was ordered to run consecutively with the twenty-seven-year 
sentence.104 Walle committed the offenses underlying the sentences 
two weeks apart; he was thirteen years old at the time.105 On appeal, 
Walle argued that his aggregate sentence of ninety-two years was the 
functional equivalent of life without parole, in violation of Graham.106  
 The court interpreted Graham as requiring the presence of the 
following factors in order for Graham’s categorical ban to apply: “(1) 
the offender was a juvenile when he committed his offense,(2) the 
sentence imposed applied to a singular nonhomicide offense, (3) the 
                                                                                                                     
 99. Id. at 1089. 
 100. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 101. Walle v. State, 99 So. 3d 967, 971, 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (certifying conflict with 
Adams v. State, No. 1D11-3225, 2012 WL 3193932, at *2 (Fla. 1st DCA Aug. 8, 2012)).   
 102. Id. at 968. 
 103. Id. In Hillsborough County, Walle pleaded guilty to “two counts of armed 
kidnapping, eleven counts of armed sexual battery with a deadly weapon, one count of 
armed burglary of a structure, one count of grand theft motor vehicle, one count of 
attempted armed robbery with a firearm, one count of grand theft in the third degree, and 
one count of carjacking with a deadly weapon.” Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. 
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offender was ‘sentenced to life,’ and (4) the sentence does not provide 
the offender with any possibility of release during his lifetime.”107  
The court found that only the first factor characterized Walle’s sen-
tences; thus, Graham was inapplicable.108 The court acknowledged 
the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal’s concerns about extending 
Graham to term-of-years sentences109 and added: “[T]he case before 
this court raises additional questions: What if the aggregate sentenc-
es are from different cases? From different circuits? From different 
jurisdictions? If from different jurisdictions, which jurisdiction must 
modify its sentence or sentences to avoid constitutional infirmity?”110 
The court “cannot expand the Supreme Court’s ruling beyond the 
limitations it set forth in its opinion, specifically its holding that 
Graham applies solely to a single sentence of life without parole.”111          
 (e)  Georgia Supreme Court 
 Georgia state courts have held Graham inapplicable to a term-of-
years sentence.112 In Adams v. State, the Supreme Court of Georgia 
affirmed the following sentence of a fourteen- or fifteen-year-old ju-
venile offender: life for aggravated child molestation, with twenty-
five years to be served in prison and the remainder on probation, plus 
twenty years for child molestation, with five years to be served in 
prison and the remainder on probation.113 The court reasoned that by 
its terms Graham forbids only a “life without parole” sentence for a 
juvenile nonhomicide offender and “does not foreclose the possibility” 
that a juvenile will spend the rest of his life in prison.114 “Clearly, 
‘[n]othing in the Court’s opinion affects the imposition of a sentence 
to a term of years without the possibility of parole.’ ”115 Thus, no cate-
gorical ban applies to a term-of-years sentence.116  
                                                                                                                     
 107. Id. at 970 (reasoning that the Graham holding “concern[ed] only those juvenile 
offenders sentenced to life without parole solely for a nonhomicide offense” (quoting 
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010))). 
 108. Id. at 971. 
 109. Id. at 972 (citing Henry v. State, 82 So. 3d 1084, 1089 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 971. 
 112. See Adams v. State, 707 S.E.2d 359, 365 (Ga. 2011); Middleton v. State, 721 
S.E.2d 111, 113 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).  
 113. Adams, 707 S.E.2d at 361-62. The indictment alleged the offenses occurred 
between May 1, 2007 and March 10, 2008; August 4, 2005 marked Adams’ thirteenth 
birthday. Id. at 361-62. 
 114. Id. at 364-65 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010)). 
 115. Id. at 365 (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2058 (Alito, J., dissenting)). 
 116. Id. Aside from a strictly literal reading of Graham’s holding and reference to 
Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion, the Supreme Court of Georgia did not provide any 
analysis in support of its holding regarding the applicability of the categorical approach. 
See id.  The court proceeded to apply the proportionality approach and held that Adams’s 
sentence did “not raise a threshold inference of gross disproportionality.” Id.  
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 (f)  Louisiana Supreme Court  
 The Supreme Court of Louisiana has held that Graham does not 
apply to a term-of-years sentence without parole.117 In State v. 
Brown, the defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and 
four counts of armed robbery for offenses he committed at the age of 
sixteen.118 Brown was sentenced to imprisonment without parole for 
aggravated kidnapping and ten-year imprisonment without parole 
for each armed robbery; the five sentences were to run consecutive-
ly.119 Upon Brown’s post-Graham appeal, the district court amended 
each of his five sentences by removing parole ineligibility.120 The 
court of appeals affirmed, and the State appealed the amendment of 
the ten-year sentences.121  
 The issue before the Louisiana Supreme Court was whether a sev-
enty-year sentence, imposed on a juvenile nonhomicide offender, is 
constitutional pursuant to Graham.122 The court began by discussing 
Graham and the accompanying dissenting opinions.123 It then drew a 
distinction between Graham’s life sentence for a single offense and 
Brown’s consecutive fixed-term sentences for multiple offenses.124 The 
court also pointed out the “difficulty of applying Graham to non-life 
sentences.”125 Moreover, recent state legislation achieved compliance 
with Graham by providing that a juvenile nonhomicide offender sen-
tenced to life imprisonment may be eligible for parole after serving 
thirty years.126 On the other hand, state laws explicitly prohibit pa-
role for armed robbery, as well as for a person convicted of three or 
more felonies, and do not make an exception for juvenile offenders.127 
Lastly, the court concluded that “nothing in Graham addresses a   
                                                                                                                     
 117. State v. Brown, 2012-0872 (La. 5/7/13); 2013 WL 1878911, at *1. The issue before 
the court was whether Graham “applies in a case in which the juvenile offender committed 
multiple offenses resulting in cumulative sentences matching or exceeding his life expec-
tancy without the opportunity of securing early release from confinement.” Id. 
 118. Id. at *3.  
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. at *4 
 121. Id. at *4-5.   
 122. Id. at *5. The court explained that Brown “will be eligible for parole on the life 
sentence after serving [thirty] years . . . at approximately age [forty-six] . . . .” Id. However, 
if his original four ten-year sentences without parole were reinstated, he could not become 
eligible for release until the age of eighty-six. Id.  
 123. Id. at *6-7. 
 124. Id. at *8-9 (quoting Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 551 (6th Cir. 2012)). 
 125. Id. at *10 (quoting Henry v. State, 82 So. 3d 1084, 1088-89 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)). 
 126. Id. at *12-13. The court explained that in State v. Shaffer it held the then-
applicable statutes unconstitutional as applied to juvenile nonhomicide offenders because 
they precluded parole eligibility. Id. at *11. However, the Shaffer “decision was only ‘an 
interim measure (based on the legislature’s own criteria) pending the legislature’s response 
to Graham.’ ” Id. at *12 (quoting State v. Shaffer, 11-1756 (La. 11/23/11), 77 So. 3d 939,   
943 n.6).  
 127. Id. at *14. 
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defendant convicted of multiple offenses and given term of year        
sentences . . . .”128  
As our state legislature has provided for these sentences, as it has 
the constitutional authority to do, we have no authority, absent a 
disproportionality review not possible or requested here, to amend 
these sentences. In our view, Graham does not prohibit consecu-
tive term of year sentences for multiple offenses committed while  
a defendant was under the age of [eighteen], even if they might     
exceed a defendant’s lifetime, and, absent any further guid-   
ance from the United States Supreme Court, we defer to the                         
legislature . . . .129 
Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s amendment of 
Brown’s life sentence, but reversed the amendment of the four ten-
year sentences for armed robberies upon holding that the court was 
not authorized to remove parole ineligibility.130  
     (g) Texas First District Court of Appeals 
 In Burnell v. State, the First District Court of Appeals of Texas 
rejected the juvenile offender’s argument that his twenty-five-year 
sentence for aggravated robbery violated Graham’s categorical ban.131 
The court explained that Burnell’s “reading of Graham is over-
broad”132 for the Graham Court applied the categorical approach be-
cause the case involved “ ‘a particular type of sentence as it applie[d] 
to an entire class of offenders who [had] committed a range of 
crimes.’ ”133  In contrast, Burnell contested not “a particular type of 
sentence” but long sentences in general.134 Moreover, the Graham 
holding was limited to a life without parole sentence.135 Thus, the 
court held Graham’s categorical ban inapplicable.136  
                                                                                                                     
 128. Id. at *15.  
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. at *15-16. 
 131. Burnell v. State, No. 01-10-00214-CR, 2012 WL 29200, at *1, *8-9 (Tex. App. Jan. 
5, 2012).  
 132. Id. at *8. 
 133. Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022-23 (2010)). 
 134. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. at *9. Accordingly, the court applied the proportionality approach outlined in 
Harmelin v. Michigan and held that Burnell’s sentence was not “grossly disproportionate 
to the violent nature of this crime.” Id.  See also Diamond v. State, Nos. 09-11-00478-CR & 
09-11-00479-CR, 2012 WL 1431232, at *1, *4, *5 (Tex. App. Apr. 25, 2012) (affirming, with-
out any mention of Graham, a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s ninety-nine-year sentence 
on the ground that the defendant failed to prove that the sentence was grossly dispropor-
tionate to his offense). 
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 (h)  United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
 Lastly, according to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit, Graham only applies to technical “life” without parole 
sentences and does not apply to a lengthy term-of-years sentence 
even when it constitutes the functional equivalent of life without pa-
role.137 In Bunch v. Smith, sixteen-year-old Bunch and his accomplice 
robbed and kidnapped a college student and took turns repeatedly 
raping her orally, anally, and vaginally at gunpoint.138 Bunch was 
sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling eighty-nine 
years.139 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Bunch’s sen-
tence and held Graham and Miller inapplicable to “consecutive, fixed-
term sentences for committing multiple nonhomicide offenses.”140 The 
court reasoned that Graham’s holding, by its plain language, is lim-
ited to “ ‘life without parole sentence[s],’ ”141 and if the Supreme Court 
wishes to expand that holding, it must do so explicitly.142 The Gra-
ham Court “did not analyze sentencing laws or actual sentencing 
practices regarding consecutive, fixed-term sentences for juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders,” which “demonstrates that the Court did not 
even consider the constitutionality of such sentences, let alone clearly 
establish that they can violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
on cruel and unusual punishments.”143 Moreover, not a single federal 
court has extended Graham to consecutive, fixed-term sentences, and 
state courts are split on the issue.144 Lastly, the court noted that a 
contrary holding would leave many questions unanswered, such as 
the number of years that would implicate Graham’s holding, whether 
gaintime would be considered, and whether the number of crimes 
would be relevant.145   
                                                                                                                     
 137. Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 551 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, Bunch v. Bobby, 
133 S. Ct. 1996 (2013).  
 138. Id. at 547-48; see also supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text. 
 139. Bunch, 685 F.3d at 548. 
 140. See id. at 553. 
 141. Id. at 552 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010)). 
 142. See id. at 553 (quoting Henry v. State, 82 So. 3d 1084, 1089 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)). 
 143. Id. at 552. 
 144. Id. at 551-52. 
 145. Id. at 552 (citing Henry, 82 So. 3d  at 1089). See also Goins v. Smith, No. 4:09-CV-
1551, 2012 WL 3023306, at *6 (N.D. Ohio July 24, 2012) (upholding a juvenile nonhomicide 
offender’s aggregate sentence of eighty-four years imprisonment because, pursuant to 
Bunch, Graham applies only to sentences that are technically life without parole sentences, 
and not to sentences that are their functional equivalent); Angel v. Commonwealth, 704 
S.E.2d 386, 401-02 (Va. 2011) (affirming a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s “three life sen-
tences [without parole], plus sentences of twenty years and twelve months, all of which 
were to run consecutively” on the ground that the defendant might be eligible for condi-
tional release at the age of sixty, and holding that the provision for conditional release 
complied with Graham’s “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” mandate).   
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2.  Graham Applies to Term-of-Years Sentences That Are the 
Functional Equivalent of Life Without Parole 
 (a)  California Supreme Court 
 Pursuant to Graham, the California Supreme Court held that a 
term-of-years sentence that does not allow for parole eligibility with-
in a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s natural life expectancy consti-
tutes cruel and unusual punishment.146 In People v. Caballero, the 
court held that a sixteen-year-old offender’s aggregate sentence of 
110 years to life, imposed pursuant to three attempted-murder con-
victions and three corresponding firearm enhancements, violated the 
Eighth Amendment.147 According to the court, Miller v. Alabama 
“made it clear that Graham’s ‘flat ban’ on life without parole sentenc-
es applies to all nonhomicide cases involving juvenile offenders, in-
cluding the term-of-years sentence that amounts to the functional 
equivalent of a life without parole sentence . . . .”148 Moreover, Gra-
ham does not “focus on the precise sentence meted out”;149 instead, it 
requires states to “provide a juvenile offender ‘with some realistic 
opportunity to obtain release’ from prison during his or her expected 
lifetime.”150 Because Caballero was required to serve over a hundred 
years before becoming parole-eligible, the sentence unconstitutionally 
denied him the requisite opportunity to obtain release based on 
“ ‘demonstrate[d] growth and maturity.’ ”151  
 (b)  Colorado Court of Appeals 
The Colorado Court of Appeals has held that a lengthy aggregate 
term-of-years sentence that is the functional equivalent of a life sen-
tence without parole constitutes cruel and unusual punishment pur-
suant to Graham.152 In People v. Rainer, the court considered the 112-
year sentence of a seventeen-year-old offender who was convicted of 
                                                                                                                     
 146. People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 295 (Cal. 2012). 
 147. Id. at 293. On the first attempted-murder count, the defendant was sentenced to 
fifteen years to life and to a consecutive term of twenty-five years to life for the 
corresponding firearm enhancement. Id. On the second attempted murder count, he was 
sentenced to an additional consecutive term of fifteen years to life, plus twenty years for 
the corresponding firearm enhancement. Id. On the third attempted-murder count he was 
sentenced to a consecutive term of fifteen years to life, plus twenty years for the 
corresponding firearm enhancement. Id.  
 148. Id. at 295; see also id. at 294 (explaining that by extending Graham’s reasoning to 
homicide offenders, the Court in Miller v. Alabama “made it clear that Graham’s ‘flat ban’ 
on life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders in nonhomicide cases applies to their 
sentencing equation regardless of . . . how a sentencing court structures the life without 
parole sentence” (citing Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465, 2469 (2012))). 
 149. Id. at 295. 
 150. Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010)).  
 151. Id. (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029). 
 152. People v. Rainer, No. 10CA2414, 2013 WL 1490107, at *1, *12 (Colo. App. Apr. 11, 
2013). 
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“two counts of attempted first degree murder, two counts of first de-
gree assault, one count of first degree burglary, one count of aggra-
vated robbery, and sentence enhancement counts for crimes of vio-
lence.”153 The court concluded that Rainer’s aggregate sentence “qual-
ifie[d] as an unconstitutional de facto sentence to life without pa-
role”154 because it did not “offer him . . . a meaningful opportunity to 
obtain release before the end of his expected life span . . . .”155 Rainer 
would become eligible for parole at the age of seventy-five, beyond his 
life expectancy of 63.8 to 72 years, as projected by the Centers for 
Disease Control.156 Rainer further argued that even if he were still 
alive at the time of his parole eligibility, his release would be unlikely 
because the Colorado State Board of Parole denies parole to nearly 
ninety percent of offenders upon initial eligibility.157 The court next 
considered the Graham opinion and the subsequent case law that 
demonstrate that “the Supreme Court has continued on its decisional 
trend of providing more constitutional protections for juvenile offend-
ers.”158 The issue being of first impression, the court summarized the 
rulings of other jurisdictions and found persuasive “the reasoning of 
those cases that have extended Graham to de facto sentences to life 
without parole.”159 The court also relied on the “broad nature of Gra-
ham’s directives,” noting “the Court did not employ a rigid or formal-
istic set of rules designed to narrow the application of its holding”; 
rather, the Court “employed expansive language.”160 Lastly, the court 
“[found] it instructive that . . . the Colorado General Assembly, both 
before and after Graham, has adopted legislation aligned with the 
principles articulated in Roper, Graham, and Miller.”161  Accordingly, 
the court vacated Rainer’s 112-year sentence on the ground that it 
was the functional equivalent of a life sentence without parole that 
“improperly denie[d] [him] a chance to demonstrate growth and ma-
turity,” in violation of the Eighth Amendment and Graham.162 
However, the same day that it announced Rainer, the court in 
People v. Lucero affirmed a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s eighty-
four-year sentence upon concluding that it did not constitute a life 
                                                                                                                     
 153. Id. at *1. Rainer, at the age of seventeen, shot two people multiple times while he 
burglarized an apartment and stole a stereo. Id. Rainer’s original sentence was 224 years—
the trial court imposed the maximum sentence for each count and ordered them to be 
served consecutively. Id. The appellate court vacated the consecutive sentences for some of 
the convictions; on remand, Rainer was sentenced to an aggregate term of 112 years. Id.   
 154. Id. at *12. 
 155. Id. at *6 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court first concluded that Gra-
ham applies retroactively. Id. at *2. 
 156. Id. at *6, *12. 
 157. Id. 
 158.  Id. at *9. 
 159.  Id. at *9-12, *13. 
 160.   Id. at *13-14. 
 161.  Id. at *14. 
 162.  Id. at *15 (internal quotation omitted).  
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sentence without parole.163 Lucero was convicted of “conspiracy to 
commit first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and two 
counts of second degree assault” based on offenses he committed at 
the age of fifteen.164 His consecutive prison terms totaled eighty-four 
years.165 The court acknowledged Rainer, but concluded that Lucero’s 
sentence did not constitute a life sentence without parole because 
Lucero would be eligible for parole at the age of fifty-seven, “well 
within” his life expectancy of seventy-five years.166 Thus, the court 
affirmed Lucero’s sentence on the ground that it “provides for a 
meaningful opportunity for release within his natural life span.”167 
 (c)  Florida First District Court of Appeal 
 According to the First District Court of Appeal of Florida, Graham 
is applicable to a term-of-years sentence that constitutes de facto life 
without parole.168 In turn, the court defines a de facto life sentence—
also known as a term-of-years sentence that is the functional     
equivalent of a life sentence—as one that exceeds the defendant’s              
life expectancy.169 
 In Thomas v. State, the First District Court of Appeal considered a 
seventeen-year-old offender’s concurrent fifty-year sentences for 
armed robbery and aggravated battery.170 The court concluded that 
given Thomas’s life expectancy of 70.2 years and his release in his 
late sixties, his sentence was not the functional equivalent of life 
without parole.171 However, the court conceded that “at some point, a 
term-of-years sentence may become the functional equivalent of a life 
sentence . . . .”172 The court “encourage[d] the Legislature to consider 
modifying Florida’s current sentencing scheme to include a mecha-
nism for review of juvenile offenders sentenced as adults as discussed 
in Graham.”173   
 The court decided Gridine v. State on the same day as Thomas v. 
State.174 In Gridine, the fourteen-year-old offender was sentenced to 
seventy years imprisonment for attempted first-degree murder and to 
                                                                                                                     
 163. People v. Lucero, No. 11CA2030, 2013 WL 1459477, at *1 (Colo. App. Apr. 11, 
2013). 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. at *3. The court declined to consider Defendant’s argument that “serving 20 
years in prison takes 16 years off life expectancy” because he failed to raise it in the trial 
court. Id. at *4. 
 167.  Id. at *4, *5.  
 168. See Thomas v. State, 78 So. 3d 644, 646 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (per curiam).  
 169. See id. at 645-46.  
 170. Id. at 645. 
 171. Id. at 646. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 647. 
 174. Gridine v. State, 89 So. 3d 909 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).  
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a concurrent twenty-five-year term for attempted armed robbery.175 
The court affirmed Gridine’s seventy-year sentence on the ground 
that the Graham holding was limited to a juvenile sentence of “ ‘life 
without parole solely for a nonhomicide offense.’ ”176 The court 
analogized to Thomas and recognized that “at some point, a term-of-
years sentence may become the functional equivalent of a life 
sentence,” but concluded that Gridine’s seventy-year sentence did not 
constitute a de facto life sentence.177 The court certified the following 
question to the Florida Supreme Court as being of great public 
importance: “Does the United States Supreme Court decision in 
Graham v. Florida prohibit sentencing a fourteen-year-old to a prison 
sentence of seventy years for the crime of attempted first-degree 
murder?”178 The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction.179 
 Subsequently, in Floyd v. State, the court held unconstitutional a 
seventeen-year-old offender’s aggregate sentence of eighty years im-
prisonment imposed for two counts of armed robbery.180 The court 
concluded that because Floyd’s sentence exceeded his life expectancy, 
even when accounting for the possibility of early release pursuant to 
gaintime, it was “the functional equivalent of a life without parole 
sentence and will not provide him with a meaningful or realistic op-
portunity to obtain release.”181 Accordingly, the court remanded the 
case for resentencing, and urged the legislature to follow Graham’s 
guidance and “ ‘explore the means and mechanisms for compliance.’ ”182  
 Thereafter, in Smith v. State the court considered a seventeen-
year-old offender’s aggregate sentence of eighty years imprisonment, 
imposed in two separate cases involving a total of eight offenses.183 
The court concluded that Smith’s eighty-year sentence was not the 
functional equivalent of life without parole because pursuant to the 
applicable gaintime statutes he could become eligible for release sig-
                                                                                                                     
 175. Id. at 910. 
 176. Id. at 911 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010)). 
 177. Id. Unlike in Thomas, in Gridine the court did not discuss the defendant’s life 
expectancy. See id. 
 178. Gridine v. State, 93 So. 3d 360, 361 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 179. Gridine v. State, No. SC12-1223, 2012 WL 4839014 (Fla. Oct. 11, 2012). 
 180. Floyd v. State, 87 So. 3d 45, 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (per curiam) (noting that the 
defendant was initially sentenced to life imprisonment, but pursuant to Graham he was 
resentenced to two consecutive forty-year terms of imprisonment). 
 181. Id. at 46-47. Because Florida has abolished its parole system, a prisoner’s 
sentence may be shortened only through incentive and meritorious gaintime, and a 
defendant must serve at least eighty-five percent of the prison sentence. Id. at 46. Even if 
Floyd received the maximum gaintime, he would not be released until the age of eighty-
five. Id. 
 182. Id. at 47 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010)). 
 183. Smith v. State, 93 So. 3d 371, 372 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (noting that the defendant 
was convicted of two counts of sexual battery; two counts of burglary; and one count each of 
aggravated assault, kidnapping, possession of a weapon during the commission of a felony, 
and possession of burglary tools, all committed within a two-day period). 
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nificantly before he turns eighty-one years old.184 Thus, Smith’s 
eighty-year sentence was constitutional because, through the availa-
bility of gaintime, he was provided with a “ ‘meaningful opportunity 
to obtain release based upon demonstrated maturity and rehabilita-
tion,’ ” as required by Graham.185  
 Most recently, in Adams v. State, the court reluctantly held Gra-
ham applicable to a lengthy term-of-years sentence that constituted 
de facto life without parole.186 Adams was sixteen years old when he 
committed the offenses underlying his attempted first-degree mur-
der, armed burglary, and armed robbery convictions.187 He was sen-
tenced to sixty years imprisonment.188 The court summarized its 
precedent as follows: “Graham applies not only to life without parole 
sentences, but also to lengthy term-of-years sentences that amount to  
de facto life sentences,” and “a de facto life sentence is one that ex-
ceeds the defendant’s life expectancy.”189  Adams’s sixty-year sentence 
constituted a de facto life sentence because he would not become eli-
gible for release during his life expectancy.190 Therefore, Adams’s sen-
tence was unconstitutional pursuant to Graham.191 The court certi-
fied conflict with Henry v. State and certified the following questions 
to the Florida Supreme Court as being “of great public importance”: 
(1) “Does Graham v. Florida apply [to lengthy] term-of-years sen-
tences that amount to de facto life sentences?” and (2) “if so, at what 
point does a term-of-years sentence become a de facto life sentence?”192 
(d)  United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida 
 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida held 
Graham applicable to a lengthy term-of-years-without-parole juve-
                                                                                                                     
 184. Id. at 374. Pursuant to the gaintime statutes of 1985, the year Smith’s sentences 
were imposed, Smith could become eligible for release after serving significantly fewer 
than sixty-three years. Id. Interestingly, the court did not discuss the defendant’s actual 
life expectancy. See id. at 374-75. 
 185. Id. at 375 (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030). 
 186. Adams v. State, No. 1D11-3225, 2012 WL 3193932, at *1, *2 (Fla. 1st DCA Aug. 8, 
2012). The court noted that if it were not for its precedent, it would have affirmed the de-
fendant’s sentence pursuant to the Fifth District Court’s reasoning in Henry v. State, 82 So. 
3d 1084 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). Id. at *1. The court also quoted Alvarez v. State, 358 So. 2d 
10, 12 (Fla. 1978), where the Florida Supreme Court rejected the notion “that the defend-
ant’s life expectancy should be taken into account . . . because ‘[a]ny sentence, no matter 
how short, may eventually extend beyond the life of a prisoner.’ ” Id. at *2. 
 187. Id. at *1. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at *2. 
 190. Id. (explaining that Adams was required to serve at least 58.5 years in prison 
before becoming eligible for release; by then, he would be almost seventy-six years old, 
which is beyond his life expectancy as shown by the National Vital Statistics Reports). 
 191. Id.  
 192. Id. at *2-3 (internal citation omitted). 
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nile sentence.193 In United States v. Mathurin, the court held uncon-
stitutional a juvenile’s aggregate sentence of 307 years without pa-
role imposed for numerous nonhomicide offenses.194 Specifically, the 
defendant, whose age is unclear, was sentenced to consecutive terms 
of imprisonment for conspiracy to commit robbery, conspiracy to car-
ry a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, attempted robbery, 
thirteen counts of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of 
violence, thirteen counts of robbery, and two counts of carjacking.195 
The court reasoned that the sentence did not provide the juvenile 
with the requisite opportunity to obtain release upon demonstrated 
maturity and rehabilitation.196  
(e) United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania 
 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
held that Graham applies to a lengthy term-of-years sentence that 
fails to provide a juvenile offender a meaningful opportunity for re-
lease during his lifetime.197 In Thomas v. Pennsylvania, the defend-
ant was convicted of “rape, indecent assault, and multiple counts of 
armed robbery and burglary” for offenses he committed at the ages of 
fourteen and fifteen.198 Thomas’s sentence was 65 to 150 years of im-
prisonment, with parole eligibility at the age of eighty-three.199 
Thomas filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and argued that his 
sentence violated Graham. The State agreed, and the magistrate 
judge remanded the case for resentencing.200 The district court agreed 
and concluded that Thomas’s parole eligibility “more than a decade 
beyond his life expectancy” contravenes Graham’s “meaningful op-
portunity” mandate.201 The court reasoned as follows: 
This Court does not believe that the Supreme Court’s analysis 
would change simply because a sentence is labeled a term-of-years 
sentence rather than a life sentence if that term-of[-]years sen-
tence does not provide a meaningful opportunity for parole in a ju-
                                                                                                                     
 193. United States v. Mathurin, No. 09-21075-Cr-COOKE, 2011 WL 2580775, at *3 
(S.D. Fla. June 29, 2011).  
 194. Id. at *1-3, *6 (noting that under the applicable federal statute, the sentences 
were required to run consecutively; in addition, Congress had abolished parole for offenses 
committed after November 1987). 
 195. Id. at *1. 
 196. Id. at *3. The court held that the consecutive sentencing statutory provision was 
unconstitutional as applied to Mathurin and resentenced him to 492 months; he may be-
come eligible for release around the age of 53. Id. at *3, *6. 
 197. Thomas v. Pennsylvania, No. 10-4537, 2012 WL 6678686, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 
2012). 
 198. Id. at *1. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at *2. 
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venile’s lifetime. The Court’s concerns about juvenile culpability 
and inadequate penological justification apply equally in both sit-
uations, and there is no basis to distinguish sentences based on 
their label. To find otherwise would degrade the holding of the Su-
preme Court. Therefore, this Court finds that the sentence im-
posed in this case, though a term-of-years sentence, violates Gra-
ham as it provides no meaningful opportunity to obtain release, 
based upon demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation, during 
Thomas’s expected lifetime. Accordingly, the Court finds that the 
sentence imposed amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in vi-
olation of the Eighth Amendment.202 
B.  Problems With the Current Approaches to Graham’s Applicability 
to Term-of-Years Sentences 
 1.  Holding Graham Inapplicable Nullifies a Constitutional Rule 
 The Court of Appeals of Arizona; the Fourth, Fifth, and Second 
District Courts of Appeal of Florida; the Supreme Court of Georgia; 
the Supreme Court of Louisiana; the First District Court of Appeals 
of Texas; and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit have erroneously concluded that Graham is inapplicable to the 
lengthy term-of-years-without-parole sentences of juvenile nonhomi-
cide offenders.203 The main rationale of these courts is flawed, and 
their holding violates Graham and enables courts to circumvent the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.  
 The aforementioned courts have one rationale in common: the Su-
preme Court explicitly limited Graham’s holding to “life without pa-
role” sentences.204 By strictly adhering to the language of the Graham 
holding, the courts reach a conclusion that does not follow logically 
from the premise. Graham was technically sentenced to “life impris-
onment,” not “life without parole.”205 Yet, the Graham Court framed 
the issue and holding in terms of “life without parole” because it rec-
ognized it as Graham’s practical sentence,206 given that Florida had 
abolished parole.207 Similarly, a court that imposes a lengthy term-of-
years sentence does not technically render a “life” sentence; neverthe-
less, the lengthy term is a practical life sentence when in reality it 
                                                                                                                     
 202. Id. 
 203. See Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 553 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, Bunch v. Bob-
by, 133 S. Ct. 1996 (2013); State v. Kasic, 265 P.3d 410, 415 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011); Walle v. 
State, 99 So. 3d 967, 971, 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Henry v. State, 82 So. 3d 1084, 1087, 
1089 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012); Adams v. State, 707 S.E.2d 359, 365 (Ga. 2011); Burnell v. 
State, No. 01-10-00214-CR, 2012 WL 29200, at *8-9 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 5, 2012). See also 
supra Part III.A.1. 
 204. See cases cited supra note 203. 
 205. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2020 (2010). 
 206. See id. at 2017-18, 2030. 
 207. Id. at 2020. 
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ensures that the defendant will be incarcerated until his death. As 
one appellate court noted, “[f]inding a determinate sentence exceed-
ing a juvenile's life expectancy constitutional because it is not labeled 
an [sic] LWOP [life without parole] sentence is Orwellian. Simply 
put, a distinction based on changing a label . . . is arbitrary and base-
less.”208 Courts ought not to violate a constitutional rule by engaging 
in a simple play on words.  
 More significantly, rejection of Graham’s applicability to lengthy 
term-of-years-without-parole sentences violates Graham because it is 
wholly irreconcilable with the spirit and reasoning of the opinion. 
The Graham Court made clear that juveniles are constitutionally dif-
ferent from adults because the characteristics of youth render them 
less morally culpable;209 additionally, juveniles’ incorrigibility cannot 
be determined reliably at the outset, and they are more amenable to 
reform.210 Moreover, a life without parole sentence is the second 
harshest punishment;211 its imposition on a juvenile nonhomicide of-
fender cannot be justified by any penological theory212 and “improper-
ly denies the juvenile offender a chance to demonstrate growth and 
maturity.”213 A lengthy term-of-years-without-parole sentence has 
precisely the same features that Graham prohibits: it imposes the 
second-harshest punishment on an offender whose culpability is di-
minished by his or her youth, it does so in the absence of sufficient 
penological justification, and it deprives the juvenile offender of a 
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated re-
form. Thus, the rejection of Graham’s applicability to lengthy term-
of-years sentences is the antithesis of the Graham Court’s mandate 
and reasoning; relatedly, it enables courts to circumvent and nullify 
the Graham holding. As one author explained,   
[w]hat difference is there really between 120 years and life besides 
semantics, because the reality is the same either way. All sentenc-
ing courts would have to do is stop issuing LWOP and instead 
start sentencing those same juveniles to 100 years, and the prob-
lem is solved. Gone would be the idea that juveniles are different, 
less culpable, and more deserving of a meaningful opportunity for 
                                                                                                                     
 208. People v. De Jesús Nuñez, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616, 624 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), review 
dismissed by People v. Nunez, 287 P.3d 71 (Cal. 2012) (citing People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 
291 (Cal. 2012)). 
 209. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026-28, 2030; see also Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 
2464 (2012) (noting that “Roper and Graham establish that children are constitutionally 
different from adults for purposes of sentencing”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70, 
578 (2005). 
210. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026. 
 211. Id. at 2027. 
 212. Id. at 2028-30. 
 213. Id. at 2029. 
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release. Gone would be the incentive to rehabilitate. Gone would 
be Graham.214   
 Lastly, some courts reason, and others certainly contemplate, that 
extending Graham to term-of-years sentences would generate a mul-
titude of line-drawing problems.215 Undeniably, holding Graham ap-
plicable to lengthy term-of-years sentences would trigger significant 
questions. For example, at what point does a term-of-years sentence 
become unconstitutional? Must courts account for gaintime? In the 
event of multiple convictions, does Graham apply to the individual or 
aggregate sentence? If Graham applies to the aggregate sentence and 
multiple cases are involved, which jurisdiction’s sentencing authority 
is restricted, and which victim’s rights are not fully vindicated? While 
these are legitimate concerns, they do not justify the abrogation of 
the Supreme Court’s decree when a logical solution is available. That 
solution is to provide all juvenile nonhomicide offenders with the op-
portunity for parole or sentencing review hearings. As discussed in 
Part IV, Graham, even when its holding is read narrowly and in a 
technical sense, requires states to make parole or sentencing review 
hearings available in order to provide juvenile nonhomicide offenders 
who are sentenced to life imprisonment with the requisite opportuni-
ty to obtain release based on demonstrated reform. In turn, the 
availability of such a mechanism should be extended to all juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders, thereby eliminating the line-drawing con-
cerns of courts that insist on circumventing Graham by refusing to 
apply it to term-of-years sentences. 
2.  Holding Graham Applicable is Proper, but Reliance on Life 
Expectancy Precludes Full Compliance 
 While the Supreme Court of California, the Colorado Court of Ap-
peals, the First District Court of Appeal of Florida, the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Florida, and the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania have 
properly held that Graham applies to the lengthy term-of-years-
without-parole sentences of juvenile nonhomicide offenders, their ap-
proach falls short of complying with Graham’s mandate. Courts that 
apply Graham to term-of-years sentences look to the defendant’s life 
expectancy and projected release eligibility. If there is no possibility 
for release during the offender’s life expectancy, as determined by the 
National Vital Statistics Report, the term-of-years sentence is uncon-
                                                                                                                     
 214. Leanne Palmer, Note, Juvenile Sentencing in the Wake of Graham v. Florida: A 
Look Into Uncharted Territory, 17 BARRY L. REV. 133, 147 (2011).  
 215. See, e.g., Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, Bunch v. 
Bobby, 133 S. Ct. 1996 (2013); Walle v. State, 99 So. 3d 967, 972 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Henry 
v. State, 82 So. 3d 1084, 1089 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012).  
2013]          “MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY” FOR RELEASE 1055 
 
 
stitutional, for it is the functional equivalent of life without parole.216 
At first glance, one cannot argue with the logic of relying on life ex-
pectancy statistics as a method of determining the point at which a 
term-of-years sentence becomes the functional equivalent of life 
without parole. However, there are significant problems with this 
approach in the context of sentencing and in light of Graham.  
 The greatest, and fatal, deficiency of the life expectancy approach 
is that it fails to comply with Graham’s mandate. In Graham, the 
Court’s disdain for the life without parole sentence stemmed from its 
findings that the sentence denies any hope of release, “forswears al-
together the rehabilitative ideal,”217 and “improperly denies the juve-
nile offender a chance to demonstrate growth and maturity.”218 Ac-
cordingly, the Court held that states are constitutionally required to 
provide juvenile nonhomicide offenders with some “realistic,”219 
“meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated 
maturity and rehabilitation.”220 The life expectancy approach de-
prives juvenile offenders of this requisite meaningful opportunity be-
cause it affords no possibility of release until a specified time, regard-
less of reform. To demonstrate the disconnect between the life expec-
tancy approach and Graham’s mandate, consider the following: A 
term-of-years sentence that provides an opportunity for release just 
before the juvenile offender’s expected death, either pursuant to gain-
time or upon the expiration of the sentence, satisfies the life expec-
tancy approach because technically the offender is not required to 
spend his “entire” life in prison. Yet it fails Graham’s mandate be-
cause it deprives the offender of a meaningful opportunity to demon-
strate he has been reformed and thus should be released early. 
Providing for the possibility of release in time for the offender to die 
as a free man or woman is hardly a “meaningful opportunity” as con-
templated by the Graham Court.221 As one appellate judge explained:  
[The life expectancy] approach misses the mark entirely. . . . [T]he 
question is not whether the defendant will have a significant part 
of his life remaining at the end of the sentence; rather, it is wheth-
er the defendant will have a reasonable opportunity to show that 
                                                                                                                     
 216. See, e.g., People v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010); People 
v. Lucero, No. 11CA2030, 2013 WL 1459477, at *1 (Colo. App. Apr. 11, 2013); People v. 
Rainer, No. 10CA2414, 2013 WL 1490107, at *1, *12 (Colo. App. Apr. 11, 2013); Adams v. 
State, No. 1D11-3225, 2012 WL 3193932, at *2 (Fla. 1st DCA Aug. 8, 2012). 
 217. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030. 
 218. Id. at 2029. 
 219. Id. at 2034. 
 220. Id. at 2030 (emphasis added). 
 221. To the contrary, it is arguably cruel to eject into society a person who spent most 
of his life imprisoned, thereby causing him to spend his remaining days struggling to 
survive for he probably lacks sufficient social and vocational skills, savings, access to 
affordable health care, a job, a home, a family, friends, or any other resources or support 
systems. 
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he has been rehabilitated during the course of the sentence        
and is therefore deserving of release at some point before the               
sentence expires.  
 . . . .  
 In contrast, the term of years sentences we have approved in 
this case do not afford the defendant that opportunity. He will be 
released at a fixed point in the future, and the timing of his release 
will have no connection with his behavior in prison or any efforts 
he might make to rehabilitate himself. He might be able to estab-
lish his rehabilitation next week, next month, or next year, but it 
will make no difference.222 
Thus, the life expectancy approach is a wholly inadequate yardstick 
for achieving compliance with Graham. Instead, the proper measure 
must be whether the offender has a meaningful opportunity to demon-
strate maturity and rehabilitation and thereby obtain early release.  
 In addition to violating Graham’s mandate, the life expectancy 
approach poses problems of its own. For one, life expectancy calcula-
tions are based on the defendant’s race, sex, and year of birth or cur-
rent age.223 These are all factors that sentencing courts are generally 
prohibited from taking into consideration.224 Moreover, if a court is 
truly attempting to determine a defendant’s life expectancy, why not 
also consider factors such as the offender’s health, personal medical 
history, family medical history, national origin, and the toll impris-
onment will have on life expectancy? Indubitably, accounting for such 
factors would be impractical, if not impossible, for it would create a 
new line of problems and transform the life determination into a trial 
of its own. The Florida Supreme Court has itself stated: 
 We reject the notion that an individual’s life expectancy should 
be used, or was intended by the Legislature to be used, to mark the 
                                                                                                                     
 222. Smith v. State, 93 So. 3d 371, 375-77 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (Padovano, J., 
concurring). 
223. See, e.g., People v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010); People 
v. Lucero, No. 11CA2030, 2013 WL 1459477, at *1, *3 (Colo. App. Apr. 11, 2013); Henry v. 
State, 82 So. 3d 1084, 1086, 1089 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012); Donna L. Hoyert & Jiaquan Xu, 
Deaths: Preliminary Data for 2011, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., Oct. 10, 2012, at 1, 26-28, 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_06.pdf. 
 224. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2006) (“The Commission shall assure that the guide-
lines and policy statements are entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin, creed, 
and socioeconomic status of offenders.”); FLA. STAT. § 921.002(1)(a) (2012) (“Sentencing is 
neutral with respect to race, gender, and social and economic status.”); MONT. CODE ANN.  
§ 46-18-101(3)(c) (2005) (“Sentencing practices must be neutral with respect to the 
offender’s race, gender, religion, national origin, or social or economic status.”); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2929.11(C) (West 2011) (“A court that imposes a sentence upon an offender 
for a felony shall not base the sentence upon the race, ethnic background, gender, or 
religion of the offender.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-102(4) (West 2012) (“Sentencing 
should exclude all considerations respecting race, gender, creed, religion, national origin 
and social status of the individual[.]”); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b)(1) (2012) (“Sentencing 
should be neutral with respect to race, gender, and social and economic status.”). 
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longest term which a particular defendant should serve. Any sen-
tence, no matter how short, may eventually extend beyond the life 
of a prisoner. Mortality and life expectancy are irrelevant to limi-
tations on the terms of incarceration set by the Legislature for 
criminal misconduct.225 
 Lastly, the life expectancy approach enables courts to render Gra-
ham meaningless by imposing term-of-years sentences that provide 
for the possibility of release just before offenders’ expected deaths. 
For instance, a sentence that provides for the possibility of release at 
the age of sixty-nine would technically not be the functional equiva-
lent of life without parole for a juvenile offender whose life expectan-
cy is seventy years. This empty distinction is analogous to a 150-year 
sentence imposed by a court that rejects Graham’s applicability to 
term-of-years sentences—both tactics allow courts to comply with   
the law in a highly technical sense, while in practice engage in            
grave violations. 
 In sum, holding Graham applicable to lengthy term-of-years sen-
tences pursuant to the life expectancy approach is a better alterna-
tive to holding Graham inapplicable and thereby disregarding the 
Graham Court’s pronouncement in its entirety. Nevertheless, the life 
expectancy approach is inadequate because it fails to comply with 
Graham’s mandate of providing a meaningful opportunity to obtain 
release based on demonstrated reform, and it unnecessarily impli-
cates line-drawing problems.    
IV.   PROPER APPROACH: GRAHAM MANDATES PAROLE OR SENTENCING 
HEARINGS, APPLIES TO ALL TERM-OF-YEARS SENTENCES, AND 
REQUIRES REHABILITATIVE SERVICES  
 Section A demonstrates that Graham requires states to make pa-
role or sentencing review hearings available to juvenile nonhomicide 
offenders who are sentenced to life imprisonment. Section B reiter-
ates why Graham applies to lengthy term-of-years sentences, re-
states the reasons for rejecting the life expectancy approach, and 
proposes that the availability of parole or sentencing review hearings 
must be extended to all juvenile nonhomicide offenders who are sen-
tenced to term-of-years sentences. Section C illustrates that Graham 
also requires states to provide rehabilitative prison services to juve-
nile nonhomicide offenders. Section D provides a brief overview of 
Florida’s failed legislative efforts to comply with Graham, discusses 
the courts’ role in ensuring compliance with the Supreme Court’s 
mandate, and provides guidance for future efforts. 
                                                                                                                     
 225. Alvarez v. State, 358 So. 2d 10, 12 (Fla. 1978) (footnote omitted). 
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A.  Graham Mandates Parole or Sentencing Review Hearings  
 Pursuant to Graham, states must provide juvenile nonhomicide 
offenders sentenced to life imprisonment with “some meaningful op-
portunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and re-
habilitation.”226 States need not guarantee juvenile offenders’ eventu-
al freedom, but may not “mak[e] the judgment at the outset that 
those offenders never will be fit to reenter society.”227 The Graham 
Court determined that a life without parole sentence “improperly de-
nies the juvenile offender a chance to demonstrate growth and ma-
turity.”228 The Court explained that the sentence “ ‘means denial of 
hope; it means that good behavior and character improvement are 
immaterial; it means that whatever the future might hold in store for 
the mind and spirit of [the convict], he will remain in prison for the 
rest of his days.’ ”229 In addition, the incorrigibility of a juvenile non-
homicide offender cannot be accurately assessed at the outset, and 
juveniles are capable of reform.230  
 It is thus clear that the Graham Court requires states to provide 
juvenile nonhomicide offenders with a meaningful opportunity to 
demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation and thereby obtain release 
from life imprisonment. In other words, the Court seems to require 
the availability of parole.231 Indeed, the “meaningful opportunity” 
standard was coined by Graham’s counsel, Mr. Gowdy, in the context 
of the availability of parole.232 The standard evolved during oral ar-
gument as follows:  
Justice Samuel Alito: --If we agree with you, at what point must 
the parole consideration be given? There is a suggestion in your 
brief that maybe the Colorado statute, which says that a person 
                                                                                                                     
 226. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 2029. 
 229. Id. at 2027 (quoting Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 944 (Nev. 1989)). 
 230. Id. at 2026-27. 
 231. See, e.g., id. at 2057 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“And what Eighth Amendment 
principles will govern review by the parole boards the Court now demands that States 
empanel?”); Smith v. State, 93 So. 3d 371, 376 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (Padovano, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he only way the courts can carry out the mandate of the Graham decision 
is to ensure that a juvenile offender is eligible for parole or some equivalent of parole.”); 
Gridine v. State, 89 So. 3d 909, 911 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (Wolf, J., dissenting) (“[T]he only 
logical way to address the concerns expressed by the United States Supreme Court in 
Graham v. Florida is to provide parole opportunities for juveniles.” (citation omitted)); 
Cara H. Drinan, Graham on the Ground, 87 WASH. L. REV. 51, 77 (2012) (stating that 
“parole must be available under state law in order to comport with Graham’s 
requirements”); Leslie Patrice Wallace, “And I Don’t Know Why It Is That You Threw Your 
Life Away”: Abolishing Life Without Parole, the Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida Now 
Requires States to Give Juveniles Hope for a Second Chance, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 35, 68 
(2010) (concluding that Graham’s mandate requires states to have “an active parole board 
and rehabilitative measures in place”); id. at 74 (suggesting incremental sentencing 
reviews by parole boards).   
 232. See Wallace, supra note 231, at 65-66. 
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can get parole consideration after 40 years, would be constitution-
al. Is that your position? 
Mr. Gowdy: Your Honor, our position is that it should be left up 
to the States to decide. We think that the -- the Colorado provision 
would probably be constitutional. We will have to see what differ-
ent States do. I mean, but -- but, yes, even that long amount of 
time would give at least some hope to the adolescent offender. 
Chief Justice John G. Roberts: What about -- what if it’s the -- 
pursuant to the usual State parole system, and it turns out that 
grants parole to 1 out of 20 applicants? 
Mr. Gowdy: I think all that would have to be required, Your Hon-
or -- I think that would be sufficient. All that would have to be re-
quired is a meaningful opportunity to the adolescent offender to 
demonstrate that he has in fact changed, reformed, and is now fit 
to live in society. It -- that’s all. That’s all we are asking for. We 
are not asking that it be automatic right to get back out.233 
The Court’s holding, however, does not expressly mandate the avail-
ability of parole and instead requires states to devise the method of 
compliance.234 This allocation of responsibility was likely due to the 
Court’s lack of authority to order states to make parole available.235 
Accordingly, Graham permits states to devise alternative methods.236 
Nonetheless, aside from sentencing review hearings, it is difficult     
to conceive of a viable alternative to parole that would satisfy          
Graham’s requirements.  
 Sentencing review hearings by trial courts could satisfy Graham’s 
mandate and constitute an alternative approach. To comply with 
Graham’s meaningful opportunity requirement, the hearing would 
function much the same way as parole review. Once the offender has 
served a certain number of years or a given portion of his sentence, or 
reached a specific age, he could be entitled to a sentencing review 
hearing by the trial court that imposed the original sentence. The 
                                                                                                                     
 233. Transcript of Oral Argument, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-
7412) (emphasis added), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2009/ 
2009_08_7412. 
 234. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (“It is for the State, in the first instance, to explore the 
means and mechanisms for compliance.”). 
 235. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980) (“There is no ‘constitutional or 
inherent right’ to parole . . . .” (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Com-
plex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979))). 
 236. See Gerard Glynn & Ilona Vila, What States Should Do to Provide a Meaningful 
Opportunity for Review and Release: Recognize Human Worth and Potential, 24 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 310, 313 (2012) (“[T]here is a clear suggestion that an opportunity for 
release will be through parole or resentencing.”); Sally Terry Green, Realistic Opportunity 
for Release Equals Rehabilitation: How the States Must Provide Meaningful Opportunity 
for Release, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 12 (2011) (“How, therefore, must the juvenile 
offender obtain opportunity for release remains the ensuing question. The answer was 
intentionally left to the province of the States to develop the ‘means and mechanisms for 
compliance.’ ”). 
1060  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1027 
 
court’s task would be to determine whether the juvenile offender has 
achieved maturity and reform and thus qualifies for release. If the 
court finds that the offender has been rehabilitated, the original sen-
tence may be reduced. If the court finds that the offender has not 
been reformed, release would be denied and the offender would be 
entitled to sentencing review hearings in specific intervals thereafter. 
Currently, no alternative methods of compliance—besides parole and 
sentencing review hearings—have been proposed. Therefore, pursu-
ant to Graham, states must make parole or sentencing review hear-
ings available to juvenile nonhomicide offenders serving a life sen-
tence in order to provide them with a meaningful opportunity to demon-
strate they have been reformed and thus should be granted release. 
B.  Graham Applies to All Juvenile Nonhomicide Offenders’ Term-of-
Years Sentences  
 This Note posits that Graham applies to the term-of-years sen-
tences of juvenile nonhomicide offenders and that the availability of 
parole or sentencing review hearings should be extended to all such 
sentences. Graham’s holding is applicable to lengthy term-of-years-
without-parole sentences for the three main reasons discussed in 
Part III.237 First, it is illogical to fixate on a strictly literal reading of 
Graham’s holding when the Court implicitly rejected a technical 
reading of Graham’s sentence and instead focused on its practical 
effect.238 Second, the rejection of Graham’s applicability to term-of-
years sentences enables courts to disregard the Supreme Court’s rea-
soning and to further the evils the Supreme Court sought to prevent; 
that is, it permits the disguised imposition of the second-harshest 
punishment on an offender whose culpability is diminished by the 
characteristics of youth, it lacks sufficient penological justification, 
and it deprives the juvenile offender of an opportunity to obtain re-
lease based on demonstrated reform.239 Third, courts and legislatures 
can avoid the line-drawing problems that arise from Graham’s appli-
cation to term-of-years sentences by extending the availability of pa-
role or sentencing review hearings to all juvenile nonhomicide offenders.  
 Moreover, the life expectancy approach currently espoused by 
those courts that properly deem Graham applicable to term-of-years 
sentences fails to comply with Graham, as discussed in Part III.240 
The fatal weakness of the life expectancy approach is that it provides 
for the possibility of release at a fixed time, sometime before and 
however close to the offender’s expected death, irrespective of wheth-
er the offender has been reformed. Moreover, the approach forces 
                                                                                                                     
 237. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.  
 238. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2017-18, 2020, 2030. 
 239. See id. at 2026-27, 2028, 2030, 2032-33.   
 240. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.  
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sentencing courts to rely on factors they are generally prohibited 
from considering, such as race, sex, and age. At the same time, it fails 
to account for numerous factors that affect an offender’s actual life 
expectancy, such as personal and family medical history, national 
origin, and prison conditions. Lastly, the approach enables courts to 
circumvent Graham by imposing term-of-years sentences that pro-
vide for the possibility of release just before the juvenile offenders’ 
expected deaths and no opportunity to obtain early release based on 
demonstrated reform. Thus, the life expectancy approach is inadequate.  
 The proper approach is to hold Graham applicable to a juvenile 
nonhomicide offender’s term-of-years sentence and to make the pa-
role or sentencing review hearing available regardless of the sen-
tence’s length.241 This approach would prevent courts from circum-
venting the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that the Eighth 
Amendment especially protects juveniles because they are constitu-
tionally different from adults. Significantly, the proposed approach 
would ensure compliance with Graham’s mandate that states must 
provide juvenile nonhomicide offenders with a meaningful opportuni-
ty to obtain release based on demonstrated reform. At the same   
time, it would obviate the need to rely on the problematic life                  
expectancy method.  
 Critics may argue that Graham’s categorical ban is inappropriate 
because what is at issue is a challenge to lengthy term-of-years-
without-parole sentences in general, not to a particular type of sen-
tence.242 However, this argument ignores the fact that these sentenc-
es are being challenged as they “appl[y] to an entire class of offenders 
who have committed a range of crimes.”243 Thus, comparison of the 
punishment’s severity to the crime’s gravity would be fruitless be-
cause the challenge does not involve a particular defendant’s sen-
tence, but a whole sentencing practice.244 Accordingly, the categorical 
approach is appropriate because it was applied analogously in Gra-
ham and is necessary because the proportionality approach would be 
unhelpful. Critics may further contend that the proposed approach is 
not sufficiently retributive, diminishes deterrence, and might in-
crease the recidivism rate. However, these arguments must fail be-
cause, as the Court emphasized, a state need not guarantee a juve-
nile offender’s eventual release.245 Additionally, given that juvenile 
offenders would likely not become eligible for a parole or sentencing 
                                                                                                                     
 241. See Smith v. State, 93 So. 3d 371, 375 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (Padovano, J., 
concurring). 
 242. See Burnell v. State, No. 01-10-00214-CR, 2012 WL 29200, at *8 (Tex. App. Jan. 5, 
2012). 
 243. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022-23. 
 244. See id. at 2023. 
 245. See id. at 2030.  
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review hearing for a considerable number of years,246 the proposed 
approach would not affect shorter term-of-years sentences.    
C.  Graham Mandates Rehabilitative Prison Services 
 In addition to mandating the availability of parole or sentencing 
review hearings, the Court requires provision of rehabilitative prison 
services to juvenile nonhomicide offenders.247 Upon concluding that 
the penological theory of rehabilitation does not justify the imposition 
of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile nonhomicide offender, 
the Graham Court explained: 
The penalty forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal. . . . 
[D]efendants serving life without parole sentences are often denied 
access to vocational training and other rehabilitative services that 
are available to other inmates. For juvenile offenders, who are 
most in need of and receptive to rehabilitation, the absence of re-
habilitative opportunities or treatment makes the dispropor-
tionality of the sentence all the more evident.248  
The Court further stated: 
[A] categorical rule gives all juvenile nonhomicide offenders a 
chance to demonstrate maturity and reform. The juvenile should 
not be deprived of the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment 
and self-recognition of human worth and potential. . . . Life in pris-
on without the possibility of parole gives no chance for fulfillment 
outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, no 
hope. Maturity can lead to that considered reflection which is the 
foundation for remorse, renewal, and rehabilitation. A young per-
son who knows that he or she has no chance to leave prison before 
life's end has little incentive to become a responsible individual. In 
some prisons, moreover, the system itself becomes complicit in the 
lack of development. As noted above, it is the policy in some pris-
ons to withhold counseling, education, and rehabilitation programs 
for those who are ineligible for parole consideration. A categorical 
rule against life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders 
avoids the perverse consequence in which the lack of maturity that 
led to an offender’s crime is reinforced by the prison term.249 
 Therefore, the Court recognized that juveniles are not only “recep-
tive” to rehabilitation, but are also the “most in need” of such ser-
vices.250 Indeed, the opinion’s language indicates that the Court pro-
hibits life without parole sentences in part to ensure that juveniles 
                                                                                                                     
 246. See discussion infra Part IV.D.1. 
 247. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030; Drinan, supra note 231, at 78; Green, supra note 
236, at 12; Wallace, supra note 231, at 67-68. 
 248. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (internal citations omitted). 
 249. Id. at 2032-33 (internal citation omitted). 
 250. Id. at 2030. 
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have the opportunity to achieve “maturity and reform,”251 a goal that 
is undermined by prison policies that withhold rehabilitative ser-
vices.252 Moreover, if states were not required to provide rehabilita-
tive services to incarcerated juvenile offenders, the opportunity to 
obtain release based on demonstrated reform would be meaningless; 
offenders would lack any realistic chance to achieve the requisite re-
form, especially in light of the prison environment, which is inherent-
ly counterproductive to the rehabilitative ideal.253 Therefore, Graham 
must entail “opportunity, while incarcerated, to develop emotionally, 
socially, and psychologically.”254 This requirement poses additional 
burdens on states, such as Florida, that do not permit juveniles serv-
ing lengthy sentences to participate in “rehabilitative, educational, or 
vocational programs because there is either no release date or a re-
lease date beyond the life expectancy of the child,”255 as well as on 
states, such as California, where “prison security classifications pre-
vent juveniles from accessing vocational and other rehabilitative ser-
vices.”256 These states must take immediate legislative action to en-
sure that rehabilitative prison services are available to juvenile non-
homicide offenders.   
D.  Efforts to Comply With Graham 
 1.  Florida’s Failed Legislative Attempts 
 Compliance with Graham has proven especially troublesome for 
the sixteen states and the federal government that have entirely 
abolished parole and for the four states that have abolished parole for 
certain violent offenses.257 Florida is an excellent example of a state 
where reform is desperately needed and legislative efforts have 
                                                                                                                     
 251. See id. at 2032. 
 252. See id. at 2032-33. 
 253. As Sally Terry Green explains, compliance with Graham requires states to provide 
“sufficient opportunity for personal development. Otherwise, the opportunity for personal 
growth will effectively become a non-opportunity as incarcerated juveniles learn to become 
seasoned criminals while subjected to the highly criminogenic adult prison culture.” Green, 
supra note 236, at 12; see also Glynn & Vila, supra note 236, at 340 (discussing juveniles’ 
development in prison systems in a section entitled “The State’s Role in Preventing 
Development”). 
 254. Green, supra note 236, at 18. Green also argues for an amendment to the states’ 
sentencing statutes so as to make rehabilitation a primary goal, id. at 22-23, enactment of 
sentencing statutes that authorize trial courts to “prescribe treatment options,” id. at 24, 
and the development of an alternative prison release model “that focuses on substantive 
rehabilitation,” id. at 30.    
 255. Glynn & Vila, supra note 236, at 340; see also Drinan, supra note 231, at 78-82.  
 256. Glynn & Vila, supra note 236, at 341 (quoting Brief for Sentencing Project as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 12, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) 
(Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621), 2009 WL 2219303, at *12).  
 257. See Drinan, supra note 231, at 77; Glynn & Vila, supra note 236, at 324-25; 
Reentry Trends in the U.S.: Releases from State Prison, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/reentry/releases.cfm (last visited July 7, 2013).  
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failed.258 In Florida, a child may be tried and sentenced as an adult 
pursuant to three types of waivers: voluntary, involuntary discre-
tionary, and involuntary mandatory.259 Florida has long abolished its 
parole system, although it continues to maintain a functioning Parole 
Commission to review sentences that were imposed for offenses that 
had been committed prior to specific dates.260 Aside from those rare 
instances, an offender’s sentence may be shortened only by incentive 
and meritorious gaintime, and even so, the offender must serve at 
least eighty-five percent of his sentence.261  Pursuant to Graham, 
Florida’s sentencing scheme is unconstitutional as applied to ju-
venile nonhomicide offenders sentenced to life imprisonment.262 In           
response, the Florida Legislature has been attempting to pass                   
corrective legislation.   
 In 2011, the Florida House and Senate introduced bills, known as 
the Graham Compliance Act, which provided juvenile nonhomicide 
offenders sentenced to life imprisonment with the opportunity for 
parole.263 Specifically, under the bills an offender is eligible for an 
initial parole interview if he or she has served twenty-five years in 
prison and has had no approved disciplinary reports in the preceding 
three years.264 The Parole Commission is required to consider 
numerous factors in determining whether the offender “has 
demonstrated maturity and reform while in . . . custody” and 
therefore should be granted parole.265 An offender who is not granted 
                                                                                                                     
 258. See Maggie Lee, Florida Struggles with Youth Life Sentences, JUV. JUST. INFO. 
EXCHANGE (July 30, 2012), http://jjie.org/florida-struggles-youth-life-sentences/90589 
(“Florida has more Graham cases than in [sic] any other state.”).  
 259. FLA. STAT. § 985.556 (2012). Voluntary waiver occurs when the child, together 
with his or her parent or guardian, “demands in writing to be tried as an adult.” Id. On the 
other hand, pursuant to involuntary discretionary waiver a “state attorney may file a 
motion requesting the court to transfer the child for criminal prosecution if the child was 
[fourteen] years” old or older at the time of the alleged offense. Id. Lastly, involuntary 
mandatory waiver requires that a “state attorney shall request the court to transfer and 
certify the child for prosecution as an adult or shall provide written reasons to the court for 
not making such request” if (a) the child was fourteen years or older, has been adjudicated 
delinquent on one of the enumerated felony offenses, and the current charge is “a second or 
subsequent violent crime against a person,” or (b) “the child was [fourteen] years of age or 
older at the time of commission of a fourth or subsequent alleged felony offense and the 
child was previously adjudicated delinquent or had adjudication withheld for or was found 
to have committed, or to have attempted or conspired to commit, three offenses that are 
felony offenses if committed by an adult, and one or more of such felony offenses involved 
the use or possession of a firearm or violence against a person.” Id. 
 260. Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Parole, FLA. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, 
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/inmates/parole.html (last visited July 7, 2013).  
 261. § 921.002(1)(e). 
 262. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010). 
 263. Fla. HB 29 (2011); Fla. SB 160 (2011). 
 264. Fla. HB 29 (2011); Fla. SB 160 (2011).  
 265. Fla. HB 29 (2011); Fla. SB 160 (2011). These factors are: “1. The wishes of the 
victim or the opinions of the victim’s next of kin. 2. Whether the juvenile offender was a 
relatively minor participant in the criminal offense or acted under extreme duress or 
domination of another person. 3. Whether the juvenile offender has shown sincere and 
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parole at the initial interview is eligible for an interview every seven 
years thereafter, provided he or she does not have any approved 
disciplinary reports in the past three years.266 Both bills failed.267 
Although the Act was endorsed by the Florida Prosecuting Attorneys 
Association, some legislators outright opposed the revival of parole.268 
Child advocates also criticized the Act and argued that parole 
eligibility within ten or fifteen years would be more appropriate 
because by then juvenile offenders become “fully mature adult[s]”; 
moreover, they deemed the twenty-five-year criterion inappropriate 
because it used to be the standard for adult murderers.269 Similarly, 
the Act has been criticized on the ground that the twenty-five-year 
eligibility criterion “strains the ‘spirit’ ” of Graham because it ignores 
the possibility that rehabilitation may be achieved long before the 
expiration of that period.270 This Note suggests that while juveniles 
may indeed be rehabilitated before the twenty-five-year period 
expires, it is within the states’ discretion to impose such a 
requirement. Moreover, the juveniles in question are convicted of 
violent, often heinous crimes. Mandating the opportunity for juve-
niles to demonstrate rehabilitation from the outset in order to obtain 
release would place the rehabilitative penological theory above all 
others, in contravention to the current trend.271  
                                                                                                                     
sustained remorse for the criminal offense. 4. Whether the juvenile offender’s age, 
maturity, and psychological development at the time of the offense affected her or his 
behavior. 5. Whether the juvenile offender, while in the custody of the department, has 
aided inmates suffering from catastrophic or terminal medical, mental, or physical 
conditions or has prevented risk or injury to staff, citizens, or other inmates. 6. Whether 
the juvenile offender has successfully completed any General Educational Development, 
other educational, technical, work, vocational, or available self-rehabilitation program. 7. 
Whether the juvenile offender was a victim of sexual, physical, or emotional abuse prior to 
the time of the offense. 8. The results of any mental health assessment or evaluation that 
has been performed on the juvenile offender.” Fla. HB 29 (2011); Fla. SB 160 (2011). 
 266. Fla. HB 29 (2011); Fla. SB 160 (2011). 
 267. HB 29 – Parole for Juvenile Offenders, FLA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=44803 (House Bill 29 
died in the Criminal Justice Subcommittee on May 7, 2011); SB 160 – Parole for Juvenile 
Offenders, FLA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/ 
Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=44816 (Senate Bill 160 died in the Criminal Justice Subcom-
mittee on May 9, 2011).  
 268. Jeff Kunerth, ‘Graham Law’ Would Replace Life Without Parole for Juveniles, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Apr. 12, 2011), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2011-04-
12/features/os-life-without-parole-graham-20110412_1_terrance-graham-parole-juveniles.  
 269. Id.; see also Sheldon Gardner, Teen Sentences Pose Challenge, THE ST. AUGUSTINE 
REC. (Aug. 1, 2011, 12:31 AM),  http://staugustine.com/news/local-news/2011-07-31/teen-
sentences-pose-challenge. Florida State University Clinical Law Professor Paolo Annino 
asserts that the twenty-five-year waiting period is unnecessarily long because a fifteen-
year-old juvenile offender “has developed psychologically” by the age of twenty-five. See id. 
 270. Green, supra note 236, at 39.  
 271. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West 2013) (“The Legislature finds and 
declares that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment.”); FLA. STAT.                
§ 921.002(1)(b) (2012) (“The primary purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender. 
Rehabilitation is a desired goal of the criminal justice system but is subordinate to the goal 
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 In 2012, the Florida House and Senate introduced bills identical to 
the aforementioned 2011 bills.272 The House bill eventually had a 
committee substitute, which provided that “a juvenile offender who is 
sentenced to life imprisonment for a nonhomicide offense may be eli-
gible for resentencing” if he or she has served twenty-five years and 
has no “approved disciplinary reports for at least [three] years before 
the scheduled resentencing hearing.”273 “In determining whether a 
juvenile offender has demonstrated maturity and reform and wheth-
er she or he should be resentenced,” the court must consider a num-
ber of factors.274 “If the court determines . . . that the juvenile offend-
er can reasonably be believed to be fit to reenter society, the court 
must issue an order modifying the sentence imposed and placing the 
offender on probation for a term of at least [five] years.”275 A juvenile 
offender who is not resentenced at the initial resentencing hearing is 
eligible for a resentencing hearing every seven years thereafter.276 
The Senate bill likewise had a committee substitute, which permitted 
a juvenile offender to petition the sentencing court to reduce or sus-
pend the original sentence upon finding the offender “has been suffi-
ciently rehabilitated.”277 To be eligible for a sentencing hearing, the 
juvenile offender must be “sentenced to a single or cumulative term 
of imprisonment of [ten] or more years for one or more nonhomicide 
offenses committed while she or he was [seventeen] years of age or 
younger”; be at least twenty-five years old; have successfully com-
                                                                                                                     
of punishment.”); 204 PA. CODE § 303.11 (2012) (“[T]he Pennsylvania Commission on 
Sentencing . . . establishes a sentencing system with a primary focus on retribution, but 
one in which the recommendations allow for the fulfillment of other sentencing purposes 
including rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation.”).  
 272. Fla. HB 5 (2012); Fla. SB 92 (2012). 
 273. Fla. CS for HB 5 (2012).  
274.  Id. These factors are: “(A) Whether the juvenile offender remains at the same level 
of risk to society as she or he had at the time of the initial sentencing. (B) The wishes of the 
victim or the opinions of the victim’s next of kin. The absence of the victim or victim’s next 
of kin from the resentencing hearing may not be a factor . . . . (C) Whether the juvenile 
offender was a relatively minor participant in the criminal offense or acted under extreme 
duress or domination of another person. (D) Whether the juvenile offender has shown sin-
cere and sustained remorse for the criminal offense. (E) Whether the juvenile offender’s 
age, maturity, and psychological development at the time of the offense affected her or his 
behavior. (F) Whether the juvenile offender, while in the custody of the Department, has 
aided inmates suffering from catastrophic or terminal medical, mental, or physical condi-
tions or has prevented risk or injury to staff, citizens, or other inmates. (G) Whether the 
juvenile offender has successfully completed any general educational development or other 
educational, technical, work, vocational, or self-rehabilitation program. (H) Whether the 
juvenile offender was a victim of sexual, physical, or emotional abuse before she or he 
committed the offense. (I) The results of any mental health assessment, risk assessment, or 
evaluation of the juvenile offender. (J) The facts and circumstances of the offense for which 
the life sentence was imposed, including the severity of the offense. (K) Any factor that the 
sentencing court may have taken into account at the initial sentencing hearing . . . .” Id.  
275.  Id. If the offender violates the terms of probation, the court may revoke probation, 
and the juvenile becomes ineligible for a resentencing hearing. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Fla. CS for SB 92 (2012). 
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pleted the GED program, unless the requirement has been waived; 
and have no disciplinary reports for at least three years prior to the 
petition.278 In determining whether the offender has been sufficiently 
rehabilitated, the court must consider a number of factors.279 If the 
court suspends or reduces the offender’s sentence, the offender must 
participate “in any available reentry program for [two] years upon 
release.”280  If the court does not reduce or suspend the sentence, the 
offender may petition the court for a sentencing hearing every seven 
years thereafter.281 Both bills failed.282 
 Each chamber introduced an additional bill in 2012.283 The House 
bill, known as the Second Chance for Children Act, was identical to 
the committee substitute for Senate Bill 92.284 The Senate bill, known 
as the Graham Compliance Act, makes a resentencing hearing in the 
court of original jurisdiction available to a juvenile nonhomicide of-
fender sentenced to life imprisonment, provided that the offender has 
served at least twenty-five years of the sentence and has had no ap-
proved disciplinary reports in the three years prior to the hearing.285 
Taking into consideration numerous factors, the court is required to 
determine whether the offender has “demonstrated maturity and re-
                                                                                                                     
 278.  Id. 
279.  Id. These factors are: “1. The juvenile offender’s age, maturity, and psychological 
development at the time of the offense or offenses. 2. Any physical, sexual, or emotional 
abuse of the juvenile offender before the commission of the offense or offenses. 3. Any 
showing of insufficient adult support or supervision of the juvenile offender before the 
offense or offenses. 4. Whether the juvenile offender was a principal or an accomplice, was 
a relatively minor participant, or acted under extreme duress or domination by another 
person. 5. The wishes of the victim or the opinions of the victim’s next of kin. 6. The results 
of any available psychological evaluation administered by a mental health professional as 
ordered by the court before the sentencing hearing. 7. Any showing of sincere and 
sustained remorse by the juvenile offender for the offense or offenses. 8. The juvenile 
offender’s behavior while in the custody of the Department including disciplinary reports. 
9. Whether the juvenile offender has successfully completed or participated in educational, 
technical, or vocational programs and any available self-rehabilitation programs while in 
the custody of the department. 10. Any showing by the juvenile offender of a post-release 
plan including, but not limited to, contacts made with transitional organizations, faith- and 
character-based organizations, or other reentry service programs. 11. Any other factor 
relevant to the juvenile offender’s rehabilitation while in the custody of the Department.” 
Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id.  
 282. CS/HB 5 – Juvenile Offenders, FLA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=47008 (House Bill 5 
died in the Criminal Justice Subcommittee on March 9, 2012); CS/SB 92 – Reducing or 
Suspending the Sentence of a Juvenile Offender, FLA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=47114 (Senate Bill 92 
died in the Budget Subcommittee on Criminal and Civil Justice Appropriations on March 
9, 2012). 
 283. Fla. HB 635 (2012); Fla. CS for SB 212 (2012).  
 284. Fla. HB 635 (2012).  
 285. Fla. CS for SB 212 (2012). 
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form” and therefore should be resentenced.286 If the court determines 
that the offender “can reasonably be believed to be fit to reenter soci-
ety,” it must modify the original sentence and place the offender on 
probation for at least five years.287 If the offender violates the “condi-
tions of . . . probation, the court may revoke probation and impose 
any sentence” it could have originally imposed; the offender is not 
eligible for further resentencing hearings.288 A juvenile offender who 
is not resentenced at the initial hearing is eligible for a resentencing 
hearing every seven years thereafter.289 These bills likewise failed,290 
leaving Florida without a mechanism to comply with Graham’s    
constitutional mandate.291 
                                                                                                                     
 286. Id. These factors are: “(A) Whether the juvenile offender poses the same level of 
risk to society as at the time of initial sentencing. (B) The wishes of the victim or the opin-
ions of the victim’s next of kin. The absence of the victim or victim’s next of kin from the 
resentencing hearing may not be a factor in the court’s determination under this section. 
(C) Whether the juvenile offender was a relatively minor participant in the criminal offense 
or acted under extreme duress or domination of another person. (D) Whether the juvenile 
offender has shown sincere and sustained remorse for the criminal offense. (E) Whether 
the juvenile offender’s age, maturity, and psychological development at the time of the 
offense affected her or his behavior. (F) Whether the juvenile offender, while in the custody 
of the Department, has aided inmates suffering from catastrophic or terminal medical, 
mental, or physical conditions or has prevented risk or injury to staff, citizens, or other 
inmates. (G) Whether the juvenile offender has successfully completed any General Educa-
tional Development or other educational, technical, work, vocational, or self-rehabilitation 
program. (H) Whether the juvenile offender was a victim of sexual, physical, or emotional 
abuse before she or he committed the offense. (I) The results of any mental health assess-
ment, risk assessment, or evaluation of the juvenile offender. (J) The facts and circum-
stances of the offense for which the life sentence was imposed, including the severity of the 
offense. (K) Any factor that the sentencing court may have taken into account at the initial 
sentencing hearing in relation to all other considerations listed in this section which may 
be relevant to the court’s determination.” Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. 
 290. HB 635 – Reducing or Suspending the Sentence of a Juvenile Offender,  FLA. 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail. 
aspx?BillId=47855 (House Bill 635 died in the Criminal Justice Subcommittee on March 9, 
2012); CS/SB 212 – Juvenile Offenders, FLA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=47205 (Senate Bill 
212 died on Calendar on March 9, 2012). 
 291. The 2013 proposals also failed. See HB 963 – Juvenile Sentencing, FLA. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId= 
50222 (House Bill 963 died in the Criminal Justice Subcommittee on May 3, 2013); SB 998 
– Juvenile Offenders, FLA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/ 
Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=50136& (Senate Bill 998 died in the Criminal Justice 
Subcommittee on May 3, 2013); Fla. HB 963 (2013); Fla. SB 998 (2013) (proposing that a 
juvenile offender sentenced to life imprisonment for nonhomicide offenses shall be eligible 
for resentencing after serving fifteen years; a juvenile offender sentenced to life for homi-
cide offenses, sexual offenses, or attempted murder offenses be eligible for resentencing 
after serving twenty-five years; if the juvenile is deemed “rehabilitated and is reasonably 
believed to be fit to reenter society,” he or she shall be placed on probation for at least five 
years; and a juvenile who is denied resentencing shall be eligible for a hearing every five 
years thereafter); Fla. CS for HB 7137 (2013); Fla. CS for SB 1350 (2013).  
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 Unlike Florida, a few states have successfully taken initial steps 
toward compliance with Graham. For example, California recently 
enacted a bill that allows a juvenile offender who has served at least 
fifteen years of a life without parole sentence to submit to the sen-
tencing court a petition for recall and resentencing, provided the of-
fender did not torture the victim and the victim was not a public 
safety official.292 If the sentence is not recalled, the offender may 
submit a second petition upon having served at least twenty years; if 
that petition is denied, the offender may submit a third petition after 
serving twenty-four years.293 The offender may submit a final petition 
during the twenty-fifth year of his sentence.294 The Iowa legislature 
also enacted a bill that makes parole available to juvenile offenders 
who are not convicted of first-degree murder and who have served a 
minimum of twenty-five years in prison.295 Similarly, Louisiana now 
provides for parole eligibility to juvenile offenders sentenced to life 
imprisonment, provided they are not serving life for first-degree 
murder or second-degree murder, have served thirty years, and meet 
certain enumerated criteria.296   
2.  Suggested Response to Failed Legislative Attempts and 
Guidance for Future Efforts  
 It is up to state legislatures to create mechanisms that ensure 
compliance with Graham; policy-making authority is properly re-
served to the legislative branch, which includes the power to estab-
lish the availability of parole or sentencing review hearings.297 How-
ever, in light of the legislature’s failure to devise a corrective mecha-
nism, courts are forced into an untenable position.298 Must courts sit 
                                                                                                                     
 292. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (West 2013). 
 293. Id. § 1170(d)(2)(H). 
 294. Id.  
 295. IOWA CODE § 902.1 (2011). 
 296. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 574.4(D) (2012).  
 297. See Gridine v. State, 89 So. 3d 909, 911 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (Wolf, J., dissenting) 
(“The Legislature, not the judiciary, is empowered to create a provision for parole.”); Floyd 
v. State, 87 So. 3d 45, 47 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (“[W]e encourage the Legislature to follow the 
Supreme Court’s guidance in Graham and to ‘explore the means and mechanisms for 
compliance’ of its opinion.”); Thomas v. State, 78 So. 3d 644, 647 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (“This 
Court lacks the authority to craft a solution to this problem. We encourage the Legislature 
to consider modifying Florida’s current sentencing scheme to include a mechanism for 
review of juvenile offenders sentenced as adults as discussed in Graham.”). 
 298. See Washington v. State, 103 So. 3d 917, 920-22  (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (Wolf, J., 
concurring) (discussing and rejecting the proposed solutions involving parole to achieve 
compliance with Miller v. Alabama and concluding that a term-of-years-without-parole 
sentence is the court’s only viable solution); Gardner, supra note 269 (discussing the 
variety of sentences juvenile offenders have received on Graham resentencing and 
legislative proposals in Florida to address the issue); Elaine Silvestrini, Courts Grappling 
with Juveniles’ Life Sentences, TAMPA TRIB. (Sept. 2, 2012), http://tbo.com/news/crime/ 
courts-grappling-with-juveniles-life-sentences-481011  (describing the uncertainties courts 
and attorneys are facing in Florida and the various proposed approaches).  
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back and wait for a legislative solution in an effort to abide by the 
separation of powers doctrine? Or should they develop a solution in 
light of the unconstitutional sentences juveniles are serving and the 
uncertainties attorneys and lower courts are facing?  
 This Note suggests that in light of the prolonged absence of correc-
tive legislation, courts should ensure compliance with the Supreme 
Court’s mandate. Specifically, courts should declare unconstitutional 
statutory provisions that prevent compliance with the Graham 
Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. Judge Padovano of 
the First District Court of Appeal of Florida supports this approach: 
Although legislative action would have been preferable, it is not 
absolutely necessary. If parole is the only effective solution to the 
constitutional deficiency identified in Graham, and I believe that it 
is, the court can cure the deficiency by addressing the constitu-
tional validity of the statute that places a limitation on the eligibil-
ity for parole.299   
Accordingly, Judge Padovano concluded that “the only lawful remedy 
is to declare unconstitutional section 947.16(6), Florida Statutes, to 
the extent that it applies to a juvenile offender sentenced as an adult. 
This would have the effect of making these offenders eligible for pa-
role under the existing parole system.”300 This approach does not vio-
late the separation of powers doctrine, for it is the duty of the courts 
to interpret and ensure the constitutionality of laws. Ample time has 
elapsed since the Supreme Court handed down Graham, and the leg-
islature continuously fails to resolve this significant matter even af-
ter repeated pleas by desperate courts. If the legislature disapproves 
of the courts’ solution, it will have a greater incentive to act.  
 Nevertheless, this approach is an incomplete solution. After a 
court strikes down a statutory provision that prevents compliance 
with Graham, sentencing courts and juvenile offenders continue to 
remain without an alternative. To actually resolve the problem, the 
court would have to specify the eligibility criteria for the parole or 
sentencing review hearing and devise guidelines for the entire pro-
                                                                                                                     
 299. Smith v. State, 93 So. 3d 371, 376 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (Padovano, J., concurring); 
see also id. (explaining that under Florida’s current system judges do not have sufficient 
authority to determine whether a juvenile offender has been rehabilitated, and, in any 
event, would be powerless to provide the offender with a “meaningful opportunity to obtain 
release” (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010))); State v. Shaffer, 77 So. 
3d 939, 942-43 (La. 2011) (striking down statutory provisions that precluded parole 
eligibility in order to achieve compliance with Graham). But see In re Diaz, 170 Wash. App. 
1039, at *7 n.6 (Sept. 18, 2012) (unpublished) (refusing to address a juvenile nonhomicide 
offender’s Graham challenge to his 1,111-month sentence on the ground that “only the 
legislature has the authority to amend the [Sentencing Reform Act] to allow for such reme-
dy, and only the executive branch can implement it”). 
 300. Smith, 93 So. 3d at 375 (Padovano, J., concurring). The concurrence emphasized 
that Florida still has a functioning Parole Commission. Id. at 376-77. 
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cess—this is beyond the court’s power. Thus, the need for legislative 
action is inevitable.  
 Lastly, this Note offers some general guidance for future legisla-
tive efforts. While the provision of sentencing review hearings is a 
viable alternative to parole,301 it remains to be seen which is the su-
perior mechanism. Compared to parole, sentencing review hearings 
may be more burdensome procedurally and economically, and the 
outcomes more inconsistent given the lack of centralized review.302 
Additionally, while parole boards are already criticized for rarely ap-
proving parole,303 sentencing review hearings may further reduce the 
chance of release because an individual judge  may be even more risk 
averse given that any future harm caused by a released offender 
would rest on his or her shoulders alone. However, the parole system 
is fraught with problems. For example, during parole hearings juve-
nile offenders do not have a constitutional right to counsel, and “pa-
role boards routinely consider exceptionally unreliable evidence like 
unsubstantiated rumors.”304 Moreover, unlike the decisionmakers on 
parole boards, “all trial judges are experienced in assessing the 
weight of evidence, facilitating the adversarial truth-finding process, 
and remaining objective.”305 “Because political connections are often 
the main prerequisite for appointment to a parole board, and because 
the process of parole is largely invisible to the public, there is a risk 
that the parole board might be susceptible to political pressure.”306 
Therefore, while further discussion is beyond the scope of this Note, 
it would be worth examining which mechanism is the more effective 
method of complying with Graham.  
                                                                                                                     
 301. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 302. See Michelle Marquis, Note, Graham v. Florida: A Game-Changing Victory for 
Both Juveniles and Juvenile-Rights Advocates, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 255, 283-84 (2011) 
(stating that the “solution” of resentencing hearings “is fraught with difficulties and carries 
with it the significant risk that juveniles across the country will face widely disparate sen-
tences for identical crimes”). 
 303. See  id at 286-87. “[C]ritics have questioned how meaningful the right to a parole 
hearing actually is, given that in many states, ‘parole hearings have become a sort of 
charade in which the prisoner can never actually win release, because the parole board 
routinely denies parole eligibility based solely upon the facts of the underlying crime, 
which is the one thing that the prisoner . . . can never change.’ ” Id. at 286 (quoting Jean 
Casella & James Ridgeway, Supreme Court Decision Limits Juvenile Life Without Parole 
(Within Limits), SOLITARY WATCH (May 17, 2010), http://solitarywatch.com/2010/05/17/ 
supreme-court-limits-juvenile-life-without-parole-but-the-limits-have-their-limits/). There 
is an “illusory existence of ‘meaningful’ parole release,” as demonstrated by statistics of 
discretionary parole releases across the nation, such as the fact that in California only one 
percent of parole-eligible offenders are released. Id. at 287. 
 304. Pari McGarraugh, Note, Up Or Out: Why “Sufficiently Reliable” Statistical Risk 
Assessment Is Appropriate at Sentencing and Inappropriate at Parole, 97 MINN. L. REV. 
1079, 1085, 1087 (2013) (internal quotation omitted). 
 305. Id. at 1089 (footnotes omitted). 
 306. Id. at 1089-90 (internal citations and quotation omitted) (quoting a parole board 
member as saying, “If the governor likes you, you might get to keep your job,” and noting 
that the requirements for becoming parole board members are generally low).  
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 Lastly, the better approach seems to be to tie parole or sentencing 
review eligibility to the number of years served, not to chronological 
age. While using age as an eligibility criterion is an arguably logical 
approach because it is correlated with maturity and reform, it has 
the perverse effect of ensuring that a younger and presumptively less 
culpable offender serves more time in prison than an older offender 
before having the opportunity to demonstrate reform. Moreover, the 
age criterion seems to place the rehabilitative ideal above all other 
penological goals.307    
V.   CONCLUSION 
 Pursuant to the Graham Court’s mandate that states must pro-
vide juvenile nonhomicide offenders sentenced to life imprisonment 
with a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demon-
strated maturity and rehabilitation,”308 states must make parole or 
sentencing review hearings available. Moreover, Graham applies to 
lengthy term-of-years sentences; accordingly, states should make pa-
role or sentencing review hearings available to all juvenile nonhomi-
cide offenders, regardless of the length of sentence, because the life 
expectancy approach is inadequate. In addition, Graham requires 
states to make rehabilitative prison services available to all juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders in order to provide them with a realistic op-
portunity to achieve the requisite reform. The proposed approach en-
sures that courts fully comply with Graham and do not circumvent 
the Court’s mandate and thereby violate the Eighth Amendment. 
Nevertheless, states retain the necessary discretion to confine de-
serving juvenile offenders behind bars for life.   
 
                                                                                                                     
 307. See discussion supra Part IV.D.  
 308. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010). 
